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vPreface
This book originated from a concern that information about risk was frequently
not well explained, understood or applied.
Risk is a complex, multi-dimensional, socially constructed phenomenon expressed
in various quantitative or qualitative ways, and understood (or misunderstood) to
varying degrees by different audiences. The different ways in which individuals
perceive risk, which determines their response to a risk, is an added complica-
tion. Effective risk communication acknowledges such complexities and focuses
on improving awareness and management of risks. Risk communication succeeds
when it uncovers ignorance and misleading information, and overcomes fear and
distrust.
The challenge we set ourselves at the outset was to produce a book that would
be a source of reference, but not a ‘cookbook’ of prescribed methods for commu-
nicating risk. It would be misleading to suggest that a ‘one size fits all’ approach
to risk communication would work in all situations. Each situation will have its
own unique set of circumstances and aims, and the manner in which risk is
communicated needs to take those details into account. However, there are gen-
eral lessons to be learned, and this book includes a number of case studies that
offer ideas about the ‘dos’ and ‘don’ts’ of risk communication.
If this book succeeds in encouraging individuals and organisations to at least
question and re-examine how they communicate risks, then it has achieved its
purpose.
Bruce Taylor
Chair of the CAE Risk Communication Project Steering Group
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Glossary
Consequence: the outcome of an event expressed qualitatively
or quantitatively, being a loss, injury, disadvan-
tage or gain. There may be a range of possible
outcomes associated with an event.
Consultation: discussion between parties on a topic with the
purpose that all parties are able to express their
views and to influence a decision in advance of
it being made.
Door stopping: technique used by the television media, particu-
larly current affairs programmes, where the jour-
nalist or reporter pursues a person for comment
often provoking aggression. This may include
staking out the subject’s house, car or workplace
until they emerge. A typical response from the
subject is an open hand on the camera or ex-
pressing displeasure at being pursued.
Dynamic forum: a method of iterative communication where in-
formation exchanged influences further commu-
nication.
Event: an incident or situation which occurs in a par-
ticular place during a particular interval of time.
Frequency: a measure of likelihood expressed as the number
of occurrences of an event in a given time.  Fre-
quency may also be expressed in other suitable
measures, such as per million units, per head of
population, per thousand births.
Hazard: a source of potential harm, or a situation with a
potential to cause loss or adverse effect.
Irrational: without logic, may be emotionally based.
Likelihood: used as a qualitative description of probability
or frequency.
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Mental map: expression of spatial perception based on
memory. This may or may not reflect current  or
historic geographic features accurately and can
include emphasis on specific distinctive or per-
sonally meaningful features or events.
Mindmap: diagram used to represent a flow of ideas radi-
ating from a starting concept. Used for brain-
storming.
Mitigate: undertake activities to reduce the severity of
impact.
Outrage: a term that has been used to describe the reac-
tion of the public to certain risks that they be-
lieve are being imposed on them.  It comprises
a subset of the hazard factors listed above.  The
factors that trigger ‘outrage’ are related to the
degree of voluntariness, familiarity, control, eq-
uity, and moral relevance, distribution in time
and space, and the nature of the risk.
Perception: interpretation of an issue or situation from an
individual’s or organisation’s point of view.
Perceived risk: see risk perception
Probability: the likelihood of a specific outcome, measured
by the ratio of specific events or outcomes to
the total number of possible events or outcomes.
Probability is expressed as a number between 0
and 1, with 0 indicating an impossible outcome
and 1 indicating that an event or outcome is
certain.
Psychographics: classifying people according to attitudes and
other psychological criteria as distinct from
demographics which classify people by statis-
tics.
Qualitative: measure by descriptive value, e.g. describing ap-
pearance, feelings, opinions, etc.
Qualitative risk assessment: As explained in the text, where the likelihood or
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the magnitude of the consequences are not
quantified, the risk assessment is referred to as
qualitative.
Quantitative: measure by numeric value e.g., it has a prob-
ability of 0.5.
Quantitative risk assessment: risk assessment where the probability or fre-
quency of the outcomes can be estimated nu-
merically and the magnitude of consequences
quantified so that risk is calculated in terms of
probably extent of harm or damage over a given
period.
Residual risk: the remaining level of risk after risk treatment
measures have been taken.
Risk: the chance of something happening that will
have an impact upon objectives (It is measured
in terms of consequences and likelihood).
Risk acceptance: an informed decision to accept the consequences
and the likelihood of a particular risk.
Risk identification: the process of determining what can happen,
why and how.
Risk management: the culture, processes and structures that are
directed towards the effective management of
potential opportunities and adverse effects.
Risk management process: the systematic application of management poli-
cies, procedures and practices to the tasks of
establishing the context, identifying, analysing,
evaluating, treating, monitoring and communi-
cating risk.
Risk perception: the way in which individuals estimate risk. Risk
perception cannot be reduced to a single pa-
rameter of a particular aspect of risk, such as
the product of the probabilities and conse-
quences of any event. Risk perception is inher-
ently multi-dimensional and personal, with a
particular risk or hazard meaning different things
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to different people and different things in differ-
ent contexts (adapted from Royal Society, 1992).
Risk reduction: a selective application of appropriate techniques
and management principles to reduce either like-
lihood of an occurrence or its consequences, or
both.
Semi-quantitative: measure using an arbitrary scale e.g. using a
relative scale of 1-5.
Silo: in isolation of other organisations or people,
ignoring interdependencies and relationships.
Stakeholder: those people and organizations who may affect,
be affected by, or perceive themselves to be
affected by, a decision or activity.  The term
stakeholder may also include interested parties.
Stakeholder map: radiating diagram used to identify relationships
between organisations or people with a risk.
Static forum: a method of discrete communication that is used
to disseminate information with no expectation
of feedback.
Strategy: plan designed to meet policy needs regarding
risk.
Tactic: activity undertaken to achieve a specific risk
objective.
Tolerable risk: risk which is accepted in a given context based
on the current values of society.
Uncertainty: a lack of knowledge arising from changes that
are difficult to predict or events whose likeli-
hood cannot be accurately predicted.
Weather bomb: large, sudden, powerful storm.
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1 What is Risk Communication?Jim Tully
Case Study – Cyanide Threats
Two threats to release cyanide into communities created unusual communi-
cations challenges for the Government in 2002/03.
An international golf tournament in New Zealand in January 2002, that fea-
tured Tiger Woods as the star attraction, came under threat some weeks
earlier when the United States Embassy in Wellington was sent a letter con-
taining cyanide and a note threatening to release the chemical at the Open.
The quantities of the toxic agent and the tone of the letter made the threat
seem credible and looked set to disrupt the event.
Standard government procedures for Domestic and External Security Co-ordi-
nation (DESC) were brought into play to engage a wide range of experts from
science and industry in assisting the police in their assessment and manage-
ment of the event.  Security was heightened appropriately, and other risk
mitigation measures were put into place.
As a deliberate part of the management strategy (to uphold public safety; to
pre-empt misuse of the information; to attenuate any potential terrorist in-
centive; and to contribute to credibility and trust), it was decided that the
public should be informed about the threat and advised on precautions.
Senior police went to the media to outline the essence of the threat, explain
what protective measures were being put in place, and recommend indi-
vidual precautions.  The public responded prudently, accepted the inconven-
ience associated with the extra checks, and the tournament went without
Introduction
Risk communication is a critical but sometimes neglected component of risk
management, whether it relates to risks within an organisation, within a sector
(e.g. public or private), or between an organisation or sector and other stakeholders.
Poor communication, or no communication, of risk can lead to ill-informed deci-
sions, over- or under-reaction to events, wasteful allocation of resources, and loss
of confidence in systems and processes established to manage risks.
This book aims to promote  risk communication skills and techniques  central to
the effective management of risk. Skills that need to be better understood by
organisations and individuals with risk management responsibilities.
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problems.  Police handling of the situation was rated highly.
A similar situation arose several months later when threats were made to
release cyanide into water supplies and public places.  Again the DESC sys-
tem was activated, and relevant scientific and industry specialists were con-
sulted to provide a sound technical base for the assessments.  Police once
again explained the situation in some detail, and members of the public were
asked to assist by reporting unusual activities or patterns of behaviour.
These episodes underscored the paramount importance of communicating
quickly and honestly with the public on risks involving public safety.  Highly
uncertain situations involving diffuse threats, or those where a dispropor-
tionate reaction to dampen down a relatively small risk could adversely af-
fect thousands of people, are best managed by providing comprehensive
information to the public. Doing so increases the chances that aberrant be-
haviour will be recognised at an early stage.  Communications can thus be
employed as a powerful tool for mitigation of the risks.
Pat Helm
The case study examples highlight how the effective communication of risk is an
integral component of a much wider process of risk management. The nature of
that relationship and its practical implications for practitioners is the underpin-
ning theme of this publication.
What is risk communication?
Risk is defined in the Australian/New Zealand Risk Management Standard (AS/NZS
4360: Risk Management) as “the chance of something happening that will have
an impact on objectives” and  is considered to have two dimensions: the likeli-
hood of something happening, and the magnitude of consequences if it did.
Likelihood is a qualitative or quantitative description of probability (likelihood
measured by the ratio of specific events to the total number of possible events)
or frequency (rate of occurrence) in relation to how likely it is something will
occur. For those who don’t think in numbers, Chapter 4 provides a discussion of
the difficulties and problems associated with using numbers to communicate risk.
Risk communication is the process of exchanging information between a range of
stakeholders for the purpose of ensuring a better common understanding of risk-
related matters. Sometimes the communication is specific, but it may also be
general. For example, it may be part of a process of establishing communication
channels and relationships in anticipation of future needs.
Risk communication is not simply a matter of notifying those potentially affected
of the risk and what you intend to do about it or of ‘educating’ them to accept
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your point of view. It is an interactive process with genuine communication and
consultation aimed at building and keeping trust, as outlined in Chapter 3, and at
the resolution of an issue.
It is essential to identify and acknowledge stakeholder perceptions and to under-
stand how citizens react to messages about risk. Generally, people tend to over-
estimate sudden, imposed risk and under-estimate chronic or life-style imposed
risks.
The term ‘outrage’, is used to describe the reaction of the public to certain risks
that they believe are being imposed upon them. The ‘Risk = Hazard + Outrage’
model created by Peter Sandman (Sandman, 1987) helps us understand why
some of the traditional methods of risk communication have failed. The public’s
acceptability of risks depends on their level of outrage. ‘Education’ – that pro-
vides them with ‘better’ information – may not alleviate their concerns.
According to Sandman, outrage management is “the engine of risk communica-
tion”. If you want to scare people mobilise outrage. If you want them to calm
down, reduce the outrage.
Risk perception scholars, such as Sandman, have identified more than 20 ‘out-
rage factors’. Put simply, outrage arises, for example, when the risk is perceived
to be:
• Involuntary: a voluntary risk is more acceptable than an imposed or coerced
risk, for example, fluoridation of the water supply.
• Uncontrollable: when people feel helpless to change the situation.
• Unfamiliar: exotic, hi-tech risks provoke more outrage than familiar risks.
• Unfair: when some people must endure greater risks than others, for example,
a prison in their neighbourhood.
• Dreadful: some medical conditions generate more fear, for example, AIDS and
cancer.
• Uncertain: when scientists are uncertain or disagree.
• Memorable: a similar event embedded in the memory, e.g. Chernobyl, makes
the risk easier to imagine.
The risk management process itself may also be a significant factor in provoking
outrage if the organisation is perceived to be secretive, arrogant, untrustworthy
or not interested in genuine dialogue and consultation.
Sandman has observed: “Many risk experts resist the pressure to consider out-
rage in making risk management decisions; they insist that ‘the data’ alone, not
the ‘irrational’ public, should determine policy. But we have two decades of data
indicating that voluntariness, control, fairness, and the rest are important compo-
nents of our society’s definition of risk. When a risk manager continues to ignore
these factors — and continues to be surprised by the public’s response of out-
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Case Study – Government Co-ordination on Risk Communications
There has been increasing attention in the last decade in New Zealand to
ensure that government agencies responsible for managing risks do so in co-
ordinated ways.  Risk issues are inevitably complex and characterised by
high levels of uncertainty.  While new analytical techniques are becoming
available, they complement rather than replace close communication be-
tween stakeholders.  This has been an important conclusion of experience in
New Zealand.
To that end, governments in the last fifteen years have established institu-
tional arrangements to ensure that risk issues in particular are considered
interdepartmentally to the greatest extent possible.  In some cases the obli-
gations for consultation are prescribed in legislation (e.g., Resource Manage-
ment Act 1991; Bio-security Act 1993; HAZNO Act 1996), while in others spe-
rage — it is worth asking just whose behaviour is irrational.”
Effective risk communication is ultimately a dialogue in which you seek to identify
the groups and individuals who will be affected and then target the message and
mode of communication to suit. Chapter 2 addresses in detail targeted communi-
cation and Chapter 4 planning and delivering the message.
Risk communication is integral to risk management
One of the myths of risk communication is that there is not enough time to
develop a risk communication plan. Well, there is when risk communication is
seen as an integral part of the risk management process. Procedures and protocols
can be set in place and adapted as required – and at short notice.
Risk management, as defined in the Australian/New Zealand Risk Management
Standard (AS/NZ 4360: Risk Management), is “the culture, processes and struc-
tures that are directed towards realising potential opportunities whilst managing
adverse effects”.
The standard also defines the risk management process as “the systematic appli-
cation of management policies, procedures and practices to the tasks of commu-
nicating, establishing the context, identifying, analysing, evaluating, treating,
monitoring and reviewing risk”.
Clearly, risk communication as an integral part of risk management must be
driven by, and supported by, senior management if it is to be effectively incorpo-
rated into management systems. This a recurring theme throughout the book.
In this context, it is important to remember the value of  good  communication
within an organisation and with partnering organisations. All too often attention
is focused on  communication with external stakeholders such as the public.
Chapter 4 outlines how staff can be involved successfully in the process.
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cific executive level mechanisms have been created.  In the area of public
safety and security, for example, government has established a system of
Domestic and External Security Co-ordination (DESC) to manage a wide range
of risk and uncertainty, and to communicate both across government and to
the New Zealand public.
The DESC system is essentially a management structure based on two sepa-
rate levels that interact closely:
• a strategic level comprising DESC Ministers and Chief Executives in central
government who assess a situation, consider strategies to deal with the
risks, approve high level policy, ensure that national resources are made
available, and develop and promulgate co-ordinated messages; and
• an operational level, managed by the lead department, which closely
monitors and assesses a situation, co-ordinates resources on the ground,
interacts with local authorities and others directly engaged as appropri-
ate, and manages the elements of response and recovery in accordance
with the whole-of-government direction.
The DESC system has operated for nearly twenty years.  In December 2001
Cabinet directed that this model be adopted for the management of all na-
tional crises and circumstances affecting national security. The DESC system
provides the source and point of co-ordination for all whole-of-government.
DESC
The media environment
A communications plan for external stakeholders, especially the public, will al-
most inevitably involve the news media – newspapers, magazines, radio, televi-
sion and, increasingly, websites. How they portray a risk can be crucial in deter-
mining the extent to which a risk is seen as tolerable, and the extent to which a
risk mitigation proposal receives public support.
Practical advice on dealing with the news media is outlined in Chapter 4, but any
communication plan should be developed with an understanding of the contem-
porary media landscape.
The New Zealand media market is intensely competitive and dominated by a
small number of mainly overseas-owned communication companies. There is a
premium on getting the news first. In this environment, journalists can be vulner-
able to public relations practitioners and lobby and advocacy groups, who know
that the promise of a scoop or exclusive can lead to prominent placement of their
story.
When the health product, Lyprinol, was launched in New Zealand in 1999 two
media organisations were offered exclusive coverage by the South Australian
manufacturer. Both gave extensive coverage to the dietary supplement made
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from green-lipped mussels and its alleged cancer-curing properties. Within days,
more than $2 million worth of Lyprinol was sold. Neither media organisation had
completed rigorous independent verification of the claims associated with the
product before running their exclusives. In 2001 the distributors were fined $15,000
for breaching Section 20 of the Medicines Act 1981 by selling a non-approved
medicine. Widespread media criticism of the coverage proved embarrassing to
both media organisations.
Competition also places a premium on conflict as a news value. Reporters striving
to make the front page or lead the bulletin, and news organisations striving to
outdo their rivals, can be very easily drawn into highlighting what they believe to
be the strongest angle for the story – often the element of conflict. In this con-
text, individuals and groups with a strong sense of outrage can exploit the media
appetite for conflict-angled stories, especially when the issue is controversial. The
differing, or even better, opposing views of scientists will be the angle when
uncertainty is evident.
Journalists have always told stories through the experience of individuals, but
this approach – ‘personalising’ or ‘humanising’ the news – is almost de rigueur.
Communicating risk has been described in terms of ‘scaring people’ (alerting
them) and ‘calming people down’ (re-assuring them). Each has to recognise the
emotional response of the public. A powerful human interest story highlighting
the personal plight of an individual affected by the risk at issue could well heighten
the emotional engagement of the public and make it more difficult to address
outrage.
When profit-driven media companies cut staff numbers, as they have in recent
years, journalists are under pressure to produce more stories. Event-based re-
porting, rather than the investigation and analysis of issues, is more straightfor-
ward. It is much easier to report the protest against a proposed landfill or wind
farm than to explore in-depth waste disposal alternatives for that community or
sustainable power generation.
Finally, the emergence of the internet as a global public sphere has had enormous
implications for agenda-setting, the dissemination of information and the reliabil-
ity of information so widely available and so easily accessed. Communication
strategies must recognise the pervasiveness and limitations of the internet in
terms of effective risk communication reflected as rumours and hoaxes; false
information; and bias. The power of official sources is undermined.
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2 Timing & Targeting theRisk Message
Erica Seville, Dan Coward, Chis Galloway & Kristin Hoskin
Having the Courage and Commitment to Raise Potential Issues
In this section we address the question of when risk communication should begin
and why organisations often find it so difficult to raise potential issues early,
whilst there is still little ‘outrage’.
Organisations are sometimes tempted to remain silent about risks, often in the
hope that the issue will never have to be raised at all. If the level of risk is
assessed to be significant then it is obvious that risk communication efforts must
start immediately to ensure that risk treatments are implemented effectively.  What,
though, if the level of risk is judged to be low or if there is currently too little
information on which to assess the level of risk?  Also, how are risk managers to
convince a sceptical senior management team that they should be proactive in
talking about risks, when the public and key stakeholders are currently nice and
quiet – just as they would like them to remain!
When considering these questions it is important to reflect on the risk manage-
ment process as illustrated in the Australian/New Zealand Standard for Risk Man-
agement (ANZS:4360). Their diagram (see Figure 2.1) of the risk management
process clearly places risk communication and consultation as starting during the
‘defining the context’ phase and continuing right throughout the risk identifica-
tion, assessment, evaluation and treatment phases.
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Figure 2.1: The risk management process (adapted from AS/NZS 4360)
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This implies talking about potential risks and involving stakeholders right from
the start, even before the magnitude and potential options for treating these
risks are identified.  This is by no means straight forward as it can potentially lead
to short-term headaches for an organisation.  But as we shall discuss, the poten-
tial long-term implications of not talking with and involving key stakeholders
early can have far more dire consequences.
A key element in effective risk communication is trust.  An organisation that has
an established reputation for upfront, honest communication about risks will be
a trusted source of information. Information given out by an organisation that has
a reputation for only reluctantly talking about risk issues, or consistently presents
information in over-reassuring terms, will not be seen as trustworthy, and will
generally not be listened to (aspects of trust are discussed further in Chapter 3).
Trust is not something that can be earned overnight, and is something that can
be lost very quickly.  One of the fastest ways for an organisation to lose hard-
earned trust is to be exposed as hiding information – either in reality or in
perception. Both can be damaging.
This section focuses discussions around three arguments as to why organisations
may not want to talk about potential risk issues:
• But the risk is actually quite small and talking about it will just scare people
needlessly…
• But we don’t know enough about it yet, so let’s just wait until we have more
information…
• But this might make us look bad – my bosses are never going to thank me for
stirring this up…
One of the best-known international experts in these aspects of risk communica-
tion is Peter Sandman, and much of the information within this section has been
drawn together from his various articles.  More information on having the courage
and commitment to raise potential issues can be found on Sandman’s website,
which is an excellent source of information (www.psandman.com).
As highlighted by Sandman (2006), the only times that an organisation should
even consider withholding information about a potential risk is if all of the below
conditions are met:
• There are absolutely no precautions against the risk that you want people to
take.
• Stakeholders don’t require any psychological preparation for what type of
consequences might eventually emerge.
• You don’t need any advice, cooperation or support to enable your organisa-
tion to effectively manage the risk
• If you did tell the public about the potential risks, there is nothing they would
want to do, say or feel. Note that this point relates to how the risk is per-
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ceived as opposed to how you have assessed the risk.
• If the worst case materialises, they will agree in hindsight that there were not
any precautions or preparations they needed to undertake.
• They don’t already know something about the risk and are waiting for you to
tell them about it…
• No one else will tell them, and, if they do, they won’t mind that you didn’t tell
them!
There are very few instances where all of the above conditions are met!
But the risk is actually quite small and talking about it will just scare people
needlessly….communicating with the public
As a risk manager it can sometimes be tempting to not highlight hazards that
have been assessed as being a small risk. One of the pitfalls of this approach,
however, is that the public may perceive the risk to be much larger than has been
assessed. The reasons why people perceive some risks to be more significant
than others is discussed further in Chapter 3.
The problem for a risk manager is that unless they are talking with stakeholders
about an issue, they are unlikely to know how the risk is being perceived.  In this
instance there are three very real risks that the risk manager faces by not coming
out and talking about a risk issue:
1 If the public learn about the risk later they may question why it was not
brought to their attention earlier.  This may be viewed as a breach of trust,
making future communications about this risk or other risks much more diffi-
cult.
2 If there is a sense that the information has been ‘hidden’ – intentionally or
otherwise – then this will instantly have the effect of increasing the level of
risk perceived by the public.
3 Similarly, if people feel that an organisation has not been open and honest
with all information, then this will make them angry.  In risk communication
terms, ‘Risk = Hazard + Outrage’, and people will be outraged that informa-
tion was hidden from them.
Justifications for withholding information because ‘people might panic’ are gener-
ally unfounded. The reactions of the public may not be exactly what you were
hoping for, but they are unlikely to panic.  Never illegitimise people’s fear and say
that it is irrational – all that this will achieve is a demonstration of your lack of
empathy.
When people learn about a risk and start taking (what are in your view unneces-
sary) precautions, this can actually be a form of emotional rehearsal in prepara-
tion for a real event.  The challenge for a risk manager is in ensuring that aware-
ness and preparation are at a level that is appropriate to the actual risk and that
it results in a constructive outcome. This involves talking openly with stakeholders,
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not only about the risk, but also about what steps people can take to be in a
better position to cope if the situation does eventuate.
Thinking through the potential consequences to stakeholders and how they might
cope with them can lead to people being motivated to become better prepared.
In New Zealand, examples where public awareness campaigns have been de-
signed to trigger this response include planning for a potential influenza pan-
demic or civil defence emergency. Within organisations similar awareness cam-
paigns have also been used for workplace safety.
Another reason it is important to talk openly about risks is rumour.  People will
often fear the worst of a risk if information is not forthcoming or openly discussed.
Fear then breeds rumour as misinformation becomes the basis of people’s views
and continues to grow as the ‘rumour’ becomes the ‘qualified’ view held.
But we don’t know enough about it yet, so let’s just wait until we have more
information….
Another temptation is to hold back on talking with stakeholders about an issue
until more information is gathered, analysed in more detail, and risk management
options are developed.  No-one likes to admit that they ‘don’t know’.  However
before delaying the release of any information about risks, it is important to ask
yourself two questions:
1 Will a raised awareness be beneficial in terms of managing the risk?
2 How might the public perceive any delay in releasing information?
“Risk managers want a public that is simultaneously paying no attention and
ready to act.” Sandman (2006).  Unfortunately, however, you can’t have it both
ways.  If the potential consequences or risks are large and require a public that
are both aware of the signs of immanent danger and ready to act to reduce their
exposure, then talking about the issue (early) becomes a necessity.
If releasing uncertain information there are two golden rules:
1 Make very clear the uncertainty of the information and the implications that
this uncertainty has.
2 Make a clear distinction for the public which actions should wait for more
information to be gathered, and which should be undertaken now.
One strategy that can be used to ensure that people pay enough attention to the
uncertainty of the information you are communicating is to ‘ride the sea-saw’
(Sandman, 2006).  This strategy involves emphasising the bit of the message that
you don’t want people to focus on; they will then naturally jump on the other part
of the sea-saw and focus on the part of the risk message that was intentionally
not emphasised.
For example, in discussing a potentially high-consequence event with high vulner-
ability or uncertainty, you should focus on the potential consequence part. The
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public will then naturally tend to focus on the uncertainties. Note that you can
only use this strategy with a neutral public that has not already made up its mind
if you are the good or the bad guy, and do not already have a heightened sense
of outrage associated with this risk.
Again, the rumour mill is another powerful incentive for talking about risks promptly
and openly.  The potential rumours that arise from avoiding questions can be
very damaging.  It is natural for people to speculate, and they WILL, so your best
bet is to be aware of speculation and to guide it as productively as possible.
Do not try to stamp out public speculation!  This will drive it underground and
make it seem like there is something to hide.  As Lanard and Sandman (2006)
highlight, “suppressed, unacknowledged and unexamined public speculation can
lead to increasingly scary guesses”. It is never too soon to speculate – specula-
tion is OK so long as it is not masquerading as certainty!
When releasing uncertain information, talk openly about the dilemma you faced
in choosing to release it.  Ironically, you should expect to be criticised for raising
undue public alarm by highlighting potential issues when the facts have not yet
been established.  However, in the long run this criticism is likely to be far less
angry and sustained than if information is withheld.  By creating an ongoing flow
of information, using regular information releases to set the context for risk dis-
cussion, it then becomes ‘normal’ (and far less alarming) to talk openly about the
known and unknown, and what steps should come next.
But this might make us look bad – my bosses are never going to thank me for
stirring this up…internal implications
It is important that all senior managers have an understanding of why risk com-
munication is important and the potential reputation and financial impacts of not
being proactive risk communicators. In particular, the short-term pain versus long-
term gain element of risk communication needs to be resolved.  There is little
incentive for a risk manager to take a longer-term perspective if their performance
is judged on the degree to which the public are apathetically letting the company
do as it likes. A risk manager also needs to be mindful of the influence of other
professions in shaping risk communication with the public. For example, legal
implications may limit the ability to communicate freely on some issues. However,
perhaps one of the most challenging aspects of risk communication facing the
risk manager is gaining acceptance and understanding from others in senior
management as to the role of risk communication.
The extent to which the company can openly talk about potential risk issues will also
influence staff comfort with raising potential issues internally.  An organisational
culture that supports free flow of information and the proactive escalation of signifi-
cant risk issues to senior managers is vital to establishing an effective safety culture.
The moral of the story is simple: if you continue to shoot the messenger, then the
messenger will soon stop trying to deliver the message.
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Targeting Communication Efforts
Challenges for risk communicators
It is the uncertainty associated with risk communication that makes it so chal-
lenging. Given that risk is about an assessment of how likely it is that a potential
threat or harm will materialise, one of the key challenges for risk communicators
is simply getting people to take it seriously. It is one thing for people to be
concerned about an approaching storm: television pictures of the devastation
caused by previous storms can help viewers picture the possible consequences
of their not taking appropriate action immediately. However, when the danger is
not concrete, such as concentrations of harmful particulates in the air, it is harder
for people to confront the reality that they (not just someone else) may be at risk
and they personally need to act.
People exposed to a risk may be affected to differing degrees and may react more
or less resiliently according to their personality. For some, the arousal of fear and
dread may be sufficient to provoke appropriate self-protection behaviour. Others
will demand proof – and it is here that a particularly awkward dilemma for com-
municators arises.
As Britain’s Prime Minister, Tony Blair, has noted, many people equate science
with certainty. They expect scientists and other experts to be able to make defini-
tive statements about the presence or absence of risk, and to provide reassur-
ance that if risk does exist, all reasonable steps are being taken to mitigate it.
However, experts may not only be unable to provide unequivocal answers but
may disagree among themselves.
Further, research over a number of years has explored the idea that experts and
the lay public view risk differently. An expert may focus on calculating the likeli-
hood of an identified risk becoming a damaging risk event. For example, how
likely is it that the risk of water discharged from chemical plants will actually
affect fisheries and therefore consumers’ health? The expert findings may be couched
in technical language, or expressed in complex sets of data. However, consumers
and people without expert knowledge are likely, the research shows, to be more
concerned about other questions, such as whether they have been told about the
risk and given the opportunity to accept it voluntarily, or not.
Because experts and those without expert knowledge tend to look at risks differ-
ently, risk communicators should not assume that it is sufficient to simply dis-
seminate expert opinions. Rather, communicators need to use appropriate re-
search techniques to help understand the ways that different ‘publics’ – groups
interested in or affected by a risk issue – are thinking about the risk.
• How much knowledge do they have?
• Where is it coming from?
• What additional knowledge do they need?
• What sources of information do they trust?
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Case Study – New Zealand Fire Service
In 2003, changes to several sections of the Health and Safety in Employment
Act 1992 to include coverage to volunteers sparked an outcry from numerous
community-based organisations that relied heavily on volunteers. One of these
changes, introduced in the H&SE Amendment Act 2002 (which came into
effect 5 May 2003), was to treat volunteers as employees for the purpose of
sections regarding hazard identification and control. Another was to make
volunteers legally obliged to take all practicable steps to ensure their own
safety and that of fellow workers. The New Zealand Fire Service was one
national organisation that relied on some 10,000 volunteers to meet its com-
mitment to emergency response and fire safety education in communities
throughout New Zealand. The Fire Service found itself in the position of ques-
tioning the level of communication required to mitigate the fears that were
prevalent within the volunteer contingent of the organisation, when to under-
take communication, and how.
Within the volunteer contingent, the level of personal risk was perceived to
be significant. The concern was personal litigation from either the Department
of Labour or private prosecution as a result of injuring a member of the public
while carrying out the role of volunteer firefighter.
The level of risk from an organisational perspective of the changes to the Act
was low. Close communication and involvement with the changes had been
undertaken by Fire Service senior management and government departments.
Despite this, the organisation recognised the need to communicate with all
members to mitigate their fears; the risk being a backlash at the organisation
through the resignation of volunteer firefighters.
A series of presentations across the country by members of the Fire Service
followed an intensive 2-day training and awareness seminar held and sup-
ported by specialists from the Department of Labour and the Fire Service for
key representatives from across the volunteer contingent of the Fire Service.
The timing of presenting the information amongst members was precise and
was completed as the changes to the Act were formalised in Parliament and
came into effect.
The result was the successful introduction of a piece of legislation that ulti-
mately enhanced the working environment and conditions of volunteer fire-
fighters. These changes are still evident today with continued introduction of
programmes and policies that support volunteerism amongst the Fire Service.
But the risk is actually quite small and talking about it will just scare people
• What are their chief concerns?
Questions like these can help build up a profile of risk audiences as a basis for a
communication campaign.
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needlessly…
The Fire Service determined the impact of the legislation changes were more
positive than negative for the organisation. They also recognised the impact
that rumour would have on the perception that existed amongst the volun-
teer contingent and the resulting backlash if no communication strategy
existed. In taking this approach the Fire Service undertook to inform and
raise awareness. Those volunteers who feared the changes were able to
become better prepared and have coped with the legislative change.
But we don’t know enough about it yet, so lets just wait until we have more
information…
“Provide information about both aspects of the risk, its low probability and
its high magnitude. But put your focus, paradoxically, where you don’t want
your stakeholders to put theirs” (Sandman, worst case scenarios). In taking
the message to the volunteer contingent, the Fire Service was able to present
the likelihood of a prosecution occurring and all the steps in place to miti-
gate this. The response, as predicted, was that the outcome of prosecution
is insignificant. From this point the act of moving the balance on the sea-
saw began. Sandman states “Then after your stakeholders are well-ensconced
in the other seat, slide toward the fulcrum from your end; with any luck they
will make a parallel move from their end. The closer you both are to the
fulcrum, the easier it is to switch sides periodically, each of you reminding
the other of whichever half of the ambivalence is being neglected” (Sand-
man, worst case scenarios).
But this might make us look bad – my bosses are never going to thank me
for stirring this up…
The proposed legislation changes were announced in 2002. The Fire Service
undertook its information and awareness campaign in March of 2003, only
weeks from when the change took place. Prior to this, concern and specula-
tion was rising amongst the volunteer contingent over the impact the changes
would have on them as individuals. At a higher level the Fire Service was
undertaking an intensive period of legal advice and raising their own aware-
ness of the impact the legislative changes were going to have. The Fire
Service approach to mitigating the concerns of the volunteer contingent was
intentional in so far as the process and programme was carefully thought
through. The balancing act that was played out came about throughout the
communication and awareness process, much in the fashion as described
by Sandman.
The Fire Service took a proactive approach to communicating the risk to all
facets of the organisation with the knowledge of the risks that existed in not
undertaking a risk communication strategy, the potential impact on its repu-
tation and the risk of volunteer resignations nation-wide.
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If people targeted to receive risk messages are stressed or under pressure in
some way, they may have so much ‘mental noise’ that it is difficult for them to pay
attention to the messages, to understand what they are being asked to do, and
to take appropriate action. They not only need accurate information but also
information presented in a simplified form, one that is easy for them to take in.
Here, risk communicators can advise on how to ‘package’ information so it is
expressed in brief, memorable messages that have the best chance of cutting
through the anxiety-driven clutter that may be affecting people’s ability to proc-
ess new material. Research can not only help to identify the best way of design-
ing messages, but also highlight the most appropriate, trusted media to use.
These may not always be mass media channels: if, for example, children are likely
to be exposed to a risk, school, kindergarten and childcare centre leaders may be
more credible sources.
Identifying the key stakeholders and influencers
Risk communication needs to reach the audiences to whom the communication
will be most relevant. The ‘general public’ may need to be reached only rarely;
more often, it is likely that risk communicators will need to target specific publics
such as the residents of a particular locality or people characterised by a shared
exposure to a particular risk.
Communicators need not only to identify the groups they need to target, but also
to prioritise them: some will be more important than others. For example, some
groups may be more directly involved than others; one group may be more
disposed to activism and protest about a risk issue than others who are con-
cerned but unwilling to become active. The communications task is not only to
identify stakeholders but also to locate key influencers.
Stakeholders are defined in many different ways by various authors, but a com-
mon theme is the idea that a stakeholder is someone who either is, or considers
themselves to be, affected by an issue – or someone who has an ability to affect
the way an issue is handled. The result may, in the stakeholder’s view, be either
positive or negative.
An ‘influencer’ is an opinion leader, someone to whom others turn for guidance
as to what position they should take on a particular issue. This guidance does
not have to be through direct exposure. For example, a media spokesperson for
an action group that stakeholders on a given issue regard as trustworthy and
credible may act as a key influencer for the stakeholders, helping to shape their
opinions. Influencers may fulfil this function in a number of settings, as they
typically have a broad range of interests and social circles. One study has shown
that 10 percent of Americans have the power to influence the habits of the other
90 percent.
There are a number of tools available for identifying stakeholders. The important
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thing is to use some kind of structured approach, probably one based on asking
a set of questions such as “Who is most affected here?” or “What is their chief
concern or interest?”. A preliminary list can be the basis of brainstorming to
identify stakeholders other than the obvious ones. The result can be categorised
according to the level of interest in or concern about the issue, degree of support
or opposition to it, or ability to influence an outcome.
Stakeholders can also be categorised according to their information needs,
psychographics (opinions, attitudes and feelings) and also demographics (age,
location, income level and so on). This ‘stakeholder mapping’ needs to take
account of the fact that people may belong to more than one stakeholder group-
ing. For example, a member of an environmental action group may also be a
resident of a district that the group considers to be at risk of environmental
degradation in some way.
For communicators, this makes it imperative to understand the dynamics of the
major stakeholder groupings with which they have to deal. Stakeholders are not
just message targets: they are people with their own interests, agendas and
opinions who will not necessarily passively receive risk messages. Rather, they
Case Study – Environmental Risk Consultation
New regulations in the last 15 years for consultation about environmental
risks have led to local and regional councils in New Zealand putting a great
deal more effort into involving the public on such matters.   The mechanisms
for doing so are not yet fully bedded down in the case of risks involving large
communities, but there have been good examples at the district level.
One such case concerned dangers to the Franz Josef Glacier Village on the
West Coast of South Island which was known to be at risk from a number of
natural hazards – flooding, landslide, collapse of a dam across a river, and
major movement or earthquake on the Alpine fault.
To ensure that the local community was fully engaged in the process of
exploring options for mitigation, the West Coast Regional Council commis-
sioned work on a qualitative analysis of community perspectives as a means
of establishing preferences for management of the hazards.  This was a
protracted process over three years but raised the level of understanding of
the issues among all stakeholders.
The Council now has good information on the community’s understanding of
the natural hazards and their levels of personal and collective preparedness;
and the people are now well informed about their risks, feel adequately
involved in solving the problems, and when committed to particular solu-
tions can be expected to understand where and why compromises have been
made.
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may resist or seek to redefine them. Neither should stakeholders be thought of as
opponents, from an organisational point of view. It may be possible to recruit
their support, or at least their tacit endorsement, of a risk assessment and man-
agement strategy.
Understanding Stakeholder Perceptions
Not everyone knows that you are a ‘good guy’, or has your appreciation of the
risk. Here we look at the way messages are received by stakeholders and at some
components of miscommunication.
Psychology of risk communication – how people interpret and respond to risk
information
In order to understand or even appreciate stakeholder perceptions of a risk it is
necessary to understand what risk perception is and how it is shaped.
Case Study – Nuclear Ship Safety
In 1991, after nearly two decades of ‘anti-nuclearism’ in New Zealand, the
government of the day directed that a comprehensive study be undertaken
of the safety of nuclear powered ships in order to help decision-making
about allowing visits of such vessels to this country.  It established a commit-
tee of enquiry with some experts in relevant disciplines, gave it Terms of
Reference that encouraged a thorough and impartial assessment, and pro-
vided funds and facilities to ensure that it could do so.
The Special Committee on Nuclear Propulsion approached its work in an
innovative and professional fashion and used a variety of established risk
assessment methodologies to explore the subject.  Despite the complexity of
the issues, and New Zealand’s relative inexperience with nuclear technology,
the Committee was given access to some of the best technical information
available and was able to consult closely with experts around the world.  It
was able to come to unambiguous conclusions and delivered a comprehen-
sive report to government in late 1992.  This report has been subsequently
assessed by specialists in other countries who have described it as ‘analyti-
cally brilliant’ and praised it in the highest of terms.
Domestically, however, the conclusions were not well received by the general
public despite the fact that the work had addressed both the sensitivity and
the uncertainty of the technical issues.  It was not government policy at the
time to try to influence public perceptions on this issue and so the review did
not allay public apprehensions.  This experience underscored the point that
risk communication is a complex process, and that expert assurances – re-
gardless of the quality – are usually insufficient in themselves.
18
Challenging the Future
A person’s perception of risk is that person’s understanding of the magnitude of
the risk based on their personal belief. Ultimately risk perception is subjective,
with their belief being moulded by many influences. These might include matters
of fact and statistics but extend beyond these.  For this reason, risk perceptions
of the same situation can and often do vary greatly between different stakeholders,
subject to individual values and judgements of what is important and reasonable.
This section explores some of the factors that shape risk perception and under-
line the importance of understanding what influences risk perception in any spe-
cific situation. This understanding is essential for any successful risk communica-
tion strategy.
Both analysts and the lay public assign values to risk based on assumptions
about vulnerability. However, whereas the analyst might use a risk equation and
quantify the risk in terms of human life, financial impact or duration of recovery,
the layperson will typically assign less quantifiable values based on inputs such
as memories, fears, emotions and a variety of information sources of variable
accuracy. Thus the analyst and the layperson will see the situation differently.
They may acknowledge a common hazard but their means of assessing the risk is
quite different. While the analyst balances vulnerability with statistical probabil-
ity, the layperson will focus on the personal losses that could result - on the
vulnerabilities that could be exposed and how important it is to protect them.
For example, many pedestrians recognise that there is a risk associated with
crossing a road against the lights but they seldom perceive the risk to their
personal safety to be sufficient to wait for the lights to change. By comparison
few people would advocate that an adult accompanied by children cross against
the lights. The risk is perceived to be greater and tolerance of the risky behaviour
is reduced not because of probability but because of what the potential loss is.
Research has shown that stakeholder risk perceptions are built upon many in-
puts. Some are:
• interpretation of presented facts;
• trust in the other stakeholders;
• previous experiences with risk events;
• previous experiences with the other stakeholders;
• personal potential losses or gains;
• level of influence in determining the risk strategy;
• ability to determine their own risk exposure (voluntariness);
• behavioural traits (e.g. tendency towards independence);
• external sources of influence (e.g. tradition, media coverage);
• personality traits (e.g. dislike of other stakeholders); and
• ability or inability to comprehend consequences.
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For any stakeholder or situation, the influence of these inputs will vary.
It is the judgements made based on such inputs that determine the overall per-
ception of risk. Moreover, the layman’s perception will be very much based on a
subjective assessment of information. Because the perceptual frameworks of risk
practitioners and laypersons are so fundamentally different, it can be difficult for
the two to find common ground. In some cases the perception may appear unrea-
sonable to others but there is always a reason behind the belief.
This is an important point. Without appreciating in some depth the influencers of
a stakeholder’s perception it will be difficult to determine whether there is poten-
tial to address concerns and move forward. Such understanding requires dia-
logue.
External information sources such as news media can strongly influence risk
perception and risk response. Singer and Endreny (1993) contrast the different
objectives of risk communicators and news reporters:
(The goal of risk practitioners is) To communicate information about
hazards and risks in a way calculated to foster rational decision-
making ….
But reporting about hazards is ordinarily reporting about events
rather than issues, about immediate consequences rather than long-
term considerations...
The contrast in these two approaches comes about because the reasons for their
communications are different. The prime motivation of the risk communicator is
to influence the future of the risk – to be proactive in terms of educating, raising
awareness and promoting action or support for a risk strategy. The reporter, on
the other hand, is focused on the now, motivated by the current level of general
public interest, what else is topical (competing stories), and a desire to report
events and opinion. Putting it in another way, the risk practitioner will tend to
focus on the facts of the situation, while the reporter will focus on the drama, the
‘story’. Success for the risk communicator is discussion and action, while success
for the reporter is readership and memorability. Because of these differences, the
language, emphasis, style and content will also differ significantly. It is therefore
hardly surprising that the two groups have very different influences on stakeholder
perceptions.
Moreover, a story will have more influence and be more easily remembered than
a set of facts, hence the age old use of stories in the form of parables, fables and
so on as educational tools. Stories tend to be personable and easily related to
whereas ‘cold hard facts’ are often viewed as abstractions, remote from the con-
text of daily life.
If it is assumed that, as Singer and Endreny state, the media focus on events and
immediate consequences, then this closely aligns with the way that individuals
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Case Study – Mt Ruapehu Eruption
A dormant volcano in the central North Island of New Zealand went through
a two-year eruptive phase in 1995/96. Concern at the time about risks to
nearby communities, to skiers on the mountain, and to aircraft flights nearby
built up to the point that the government became engaged. Some in the
scientific community had become caught up with the extreme consequences
of ‘worst-case possibilities’, which had led to a degree of public apprehen-
sion.  These fears had become magnified overseas to such an extent that
winter tourism had declined markedly.
In order to arrive at an assessment of the dangers, Cabinet directed that a
risk review take place that was well grounded in hazard realities.  Experts in
the various geophysical disciplines were brought together for several days,
not only to analyse the risks but to think through the implications for people
and communities, and to consider mitigation possibilities.
The use of a structured risk assessment took the focus off the most extreme
and highly unlikely volcanic possibilities, and helped put the community risks
into better perspective. It highlighted the need to understand the complete
integrated safety picture, not just the source of the problem, and it under-
scored the value of dispassionate risk communication in reassuring the public.
New arrangements for monitoring the volcanic activity were put in place and
response mechanisms were re-aligned to the specific risks.
The risk communication that followed was done in accordance with classic
principles of consultation and communication. The Prime Minister at the time
took a close interest; he visited the area and talked extensively with local
people; there was a great deal of two-way exchange with those affected; and
a communications programme was put in place to address concerns and
reassure visitors and residents on the basis of collective expert views. The
outcome was that tourists returned to the area, the ski-fields began operat-
ing again, and people learned to accept the low level volcanic activity.
This experience brought out several important communications themes: the
concerns that can be generated among members of the public about unfamil-
iar geophysical effects when scientific experts disagree; the knock-on conse-
quences, especially the messages that can be picked up by risk averse people
overseas; the importance of two-way communication; the misapprehensions
that can be created through excessive media focus on narrow risk issues; and
the value of plain communications backed by rational risk assessment.
perceive risk. The individual’s focus is not on risk planning, but rather on the
impacts of risk realisation. People can relate to this approach more easily than
they can to an analytical representation of risk.
It is worth commenting further on the impact of the media in shaping risk percep-
21
Timing & Targeting the Risk Message
tion. It has been found (Lee, 1981) that although we draw upon our own past
experiences in shaping risk perceptions, our experiences are seldom extensive
and media reporting is often drawn upon instead. A study following an earth-
quake in the USA (Rodrigue et al, 1997), that compared mental maps of signifi-
cant earthquake damage made by locals with actual damage maps, found that
the test subjects (the locals) produced maps mimicing the media portrayal. This
was in contrast to the actual severity of damage in the area of the subjects, which
was greater, but received little media attention. Here again, people were more
influenced by stories than by facts.
An additional point is that media stories tend to be of actual events – of disasters
and so on – and so will scare people. It is far more difficult to reassure people
than it is to scare them, especially when they have already been scared. This is
where the issue of trust becomes important. Trust is addressed further in the
following chapter
Risk perception can be biased in two ways, depending on context. If the risk is
perceived to be greater than analysis would indicate, it can lead to attitudes and
actions aimed at blocking a proposed activity, as with the objections to Project
Aqua on the Waitaki River. On the other hand, if the risk is perceived to be
negligible, which is often the case when an event has not occurred for a substan-
tial time, as with New Orleans 2006, the response may be inactivity or compla-
cency. The latter response generated when a risk is presented often frustrates risk
practitioners. Inactivity or complacency is strongly influenced by perception.
Once again the interactivity implicit in risk communication is a tool that can be
used to overcome this inaction. Risk communication strategies can be custom-
ised to meet the needs of stakeholders in a way that increases understanding
and is more likely to generate consequential action.
Communicating about risk provides the risk practitioner with an insight into the
types of influences that are shaping perception. This can allow a practitioner to
focus and shape risk information in a way that relates to their stakeholders, for
Case Study – Ohakune
An example of differing risk perceptions was found in a study of the resident
population of Ohakune (Patton et al, 2000). Ohakune, near the base of Mt.
Ruapehu, is exposed to volcanic hazards. Occupations are predominantly
either agricultural or winter sports based. The study found that those in the
agricultural sector thought there was no need for risk mitigation for volcanic
hazards because they did not see any great risk .  In contrast, the beliefs of
those in the winter sports sector were influenced by their occupational de-
pendence on the mountain. They indicated that there was indeed a need for
volcanic hazard mitigation. In this case the risk perceptions of the two groups
were strongly influenced by the nature of their experience and interaction
with the mountain.
22
Challenging the Future
example changing the format or language to accommodate stakeholder needs.
This might include emphasising potential personal consequences of inaction or
relating statistics to probabilities of more familiar events.
The value of stakeholder communication is sometimes limited to achieving buy-
in, but more often the true value is in obtaining stakeholder input to validate or
improve risk assessments and strategies. Understanding stakeholder perceptions
allows the risk practitioner to better appreciate the context of the risk and appro-
priateness of risk strategies. The risk practitioner may not initially be cognisant of
some of the broader consequences of a given strategy. Applying stakeholder
values provides a test of the robustness of a risk strategy and may provide
insight into consequences that have not previously been considered. As such,
input through risk communication can serve to refine and improve risk strategies.
The following case study gives an instance of a successful risk communication
strategy, and shows the importance of obtaining community trust and buy-in. Its
success depended on the strategy addressing the actual needs of people in a way
that they could understand and appreciate.
Tailoring the Message to Suit the Audience
Case studies throughout this book illustrate that there are a variety of approaches
to communicating about risks and that there is no single solution that fits all
situations. One commonality that does appear is that effective risk communica-
tion requires tailoring to suit the needs of all stakeholders.
Regardless of the current stage of the risk management process taking place, a
risk communicator needs to identify the concerns of the stakeholders that  need
to be addressed. This requires the risk communicator to think about the risk in
two different ways. Firstly – what information do I seek to convey and what action
do I wish to generate? Secondly – what concerns and potential misconceptions
on the part of stakeholders do I need to address?
Correcting misconceptions and addressing major concerns (if there are any) are
two of the most constructive ways of influencing the risk perceptions of the
audience. They raise credibility and help to direct focus towards the core mes-
sages. It is difficult for people to take in information if other issues are preying on
their minds. Addressing concerns will enable the stakeholders to be more recep-
tive to information and ideas that are presented.
Being mindful of the needs of all parties involved in the risk communication will
allow for greater customisation of the content of the communication.
Communication forum
The next consideration is to determine the format of the communication and the
forum within which discussion takes place. The choice of available communica-
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Case Study – Te Kotahitanga
Te Kotahitanga is a project that has been running in Northland for a number
of years for the purpose of reducing fire risk in the home (Hoskin, 2006).
Since its inception several similar projects have been run in various parts of
New Zealand collectively making up a larger fire safety ambassador pro-
gramme. This programme is coordinated through the New Zealand Fire Serv-
ice with support from other organisations.
The objective of the programme is to reduce fire deaths in the home by
encouraging people to implement home fire safety. This includes reducing
the risk of fire and having plans for how to get out of homes if a fire occurs.
The programme includes a number of interactions, as explained below.
Fire Safety ambassadors visit the home and provide educational material
that they then talk about and relate to the specific home. They survey the
home for fire hazards and advise on how these can be addressed and what
the potential consequences are of not addressing them. They also advise on
and provide tools for developing a home fire evacuation plan. Ambassadors
elicit agreement from the occupants to develop and practice the plan within
a certain time frame in exchange for upgrading the home smoke detectors.
The ambassadors then check the location and efficacy of smoke detectors in
the home, moving, replacing and installing detectors as needed. Before leav-
ing the home they provide an opportunity to discuss everything they have
done and ask specific questions to determine the occupants’ understanding
of the risks. Follow up visits and phone calls are used to interview occupants
and confirm that home evacuation plans are put in place, to reinforce mes-
sages that were presented, and provide further advice if necessary.
The success of the programme is evidenced by discussion of fire safety in the
community through referrals to the programme and by the high follow-through
in occupants taking action to reduce fire risk in the home. Interviews con-
ducted over a six-month period indicated a heightened awareness and con-
tinued activity to reduce fire risks by respondents with feedback consistently
emphasising appreciation of the way the risks were explained. The level of
comprehension was significantly greater than that of the control group.
tion options has increased markedly over the last 20 years, but primarily comes
down to the following considerations:
• desired level of interaction;
• accessibility and usability of the forum for all parties;
• time frames;
• number of stakeholders (for this communication); and
• budget.
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The suitability of a communication forum will vary with the content of the com-
munication and the relationship with the stakeholders. A basic consideration is
whether a dynamic forum or a static forum is more useful. Dynamic fora lend
themselves to interaction whereas static fora are primarily, but not exclusively, a
means of information dissemination. It may be that a combination of the two is
needed with one providing input to the other.
A dynamic forum (such as a public meeting) means that you can easily get feed-
back and determine the effect of the communication. It may be that you want
feedback in order to shape the communication as it progresses, to shape the next
communication or to provide inputs to the risk management. Dynamic fora pro-
vide an opportunity to understand needs and stakeholder concerns as well as to
gauge the level of understanding that different stakeholders have. It may be that
the stakeholders want a dynamic forum because they want input into the risk
management. They may need to vent frustrations or have specific questions ad-
dressed.
Dynamic fora require an interactive approach and have the potential to become
confrontational. There is also the potential for outspoken individuals to increase
their sway with the rest of the audience, but they can also provide an opportunity
to establish relationships and to appreciate how the needs of stakeholders will
have to be incorporated into the risk strategy.
For a successful meeting, it is essential that the risk communicator has a clear
understanding of group dynamics and individual psychology. If, for example, the
aim is to correct some misapprehensions, the first thing is to remember that they
are usually emotionally-held views. The strategy must therefore be to deal first
with the subconscious, emotional side of things. This will generally involve build-
ing trust, a matter discussed in the next chapter. Various techniques can be used.
But only after the unconscious issues have been dealt with can facts be intro-
duced to correct the misapprehensions.
Examples of dynamic fora: Surveys, one-on-ones, public meetings, workshops,
weblogs and wikis.
A static forum (such as a newsletter) provides greater control over content and a
better ability to structure communication. Static fora are ideal for information
dissemination and provide stakeholders the opportunity to consider the informa-
tion at their leisure, confer with others, or to ignore it. Static fora allow for
delayed response and can be particularly useful where individuals want time to
prepare a response. Static fora are more difficult to assess in terms of efficacy
than dynamic fora. Static fora do not easily lend themselves to an uptake of
behaviour change or increased ownership of the risk but are useful in providing
detailed information and maintaining contact.
Examples of static fora: Newsletters, press releases, media interviews, websites,
lectures, posters, feedback forms.
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Stakeholder characteristics
Regardless of whether static or dynamic fora are employed it is important to
makes sure that a ‘one size fits all’ approach is not used. Not every risk commu-
nication will involve all stakeholders and not every risk project will span public
through internal stakeholders. A useful first step is to compartmentalise stakeholders
into groups. This allows the communicator to customise both content and fora to
suit stakeholder needs. Considerations will vary with each risk project. The fol-
lowing demographic distinctions illustrate this.
Geography, demographics and socio-economics all have to be considered in tai-
loring a risk communication. There is little point developing a website as a forum
for information dissemination if only 10% of the audience is computer literate and
has Internet access. Similarly the response to a public meeting during work hours
is unlikely to be high for those with day jobs. It may however work well for older
populations that often don’t like to drive at night. Low socio-economic groups
may not receive daily newspapers and rural populations may have infrequent
postal access.
The education and profession of the audience will determine the nature of the
language to be used and what components of the risk are of highest concern. For
example; company directors are likely to want to address strategic issues, depart-
ments within organisations may be interested in logistical details, residents are
concerned about environmental and lifestyle impacts, and shop owners want to
know the nature of disruptions to business and impacts on sales. Internal risk
communication, such as with staff, is likely to allow for the use of industry jargon,
and an expectation of understanding of the risk concepts and implications. In
contrast, clients may not be as conversant, and generally every effort should be
made to avoid jargon. The inclusion of background material and detailed expla-
nations may be required in order to facilitate an understanding of the risk impli-
cations and what is required in order to address the risk.
Customising the messages and the way they are initiated and exchanged can
contribute greatly in evolving both the specific and overall risk strategies that are
developed.
Time frames
Anticipating disruption or impact periods and incorporating time frames into the
content of the risk communication as well as mapping out the time frames for the
communication are crucial. Without an appreciation of the time scales involved it
is difficult to schedule and to progress the risk communication appropriately.
Questions to consider when planning time frames might be:
• How long is there to prepare?
• How quickly is feedback required?
• What consultation period is specified?
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• How many communications are anticipated?
• Is the risk communication reactive?
• Over what period will people be affected either by the risk or risk related
activity?
All of these questions feed into determining the available time frame for prepar-
ing a strategy and for planning the delivery and engagement schedule.
If the next communication is to be a newsletter in two weeks time and there is a
television exposé tonight it might be worth re-evaluating the risk communication
schedule in order to get as much benefit (or redress concerns as promptly) fol-
lowing the television coverage as possible.
Clarity regarding the objectives to be achieved within a time frame is also impor-
tant. Holding a staff meeting on the options for addressing a risk after a preferred
strategy has already been determined is bound to result in controversy and po-
tentially alienation. In contrast, holding a staff meeting in order to address con-
cerns about the strategy’s implementation phase and raise awareness of short
term risks arising from that strategy may well be appropriate. The first meeting
scenario would encourage a perception that the organisation doesn’t care what
staff think, whereas the second encourages a perception that the organisation is
attempting to minimise disruption and consider staff needs. The perception of
the organisation will then impact on the acceptability of the strategy that is
taken.
The time frame and extent of impact associated with risk realisation (a predicted
risk event occurring) requires consideration. If the risk or risk strategy is going to
adversely affect many people at the same time there will be greater concern than
if the same number of people are affected in smaller increments. This is best
illustrated through disasters. The impact of the Ballantyne’s Fire in Christchurch in
1947 was instrumental in shaping fire safety in New Zealand (see Chapter 4,
pages 71-72). The fire had a high death toll because many of those that were in
the building did not perceive the threat as more than a temporary inconvenience
until too late. The public outcry that ensued and the subsequent changes to
legislation were a direct reaction to the number of deaths in that single event. If
41 people had died in 41 separate fires across the city over a year it is unlikely
that the response would have been as great or far-reaching.
In summary, the core components of effectively timing and targeting risk commu-
nication are to consider stakeholder needs and perceptions as a part of determin-
ing the overall risk communication strategy and each individual communication.
Risk communication provides feedback to all that are involved, in this way shap-
ing perceptions of risk communicators and stakeholders. As these perceptions
evolve, so does the ability to best determine the way forward in addressing the
risk.
Finally, three detailed requirements for good risk communication are:
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1 Follow up – When input is provided people want to know that it was used. It
is respectful to provide follow up to contributors, and this has a positive effect
on organisational reputation that will assist future engagement.
2 Value different perceptions – People develop ideas and impressions logically.
Acknowledging alternative views on a risk and encouraging the expression of
these perceptions may present ideas that can contribute to improving risk
strategies as well as determining what misconceptions need to be addressed.
3 Evaluate – Make sure that two-way communication is taking place, and moni-
tor its effectiveness. Evaluate in a way that can be learned from in the future.
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3 Getting the MessageEnvironment Right
Bruce Taylor, Kristin Hoskin & Jo Martin
Building and Keeping Trust
When science and society cross swords, it is often over the question of risk.
(House of Lords, 2000)
A primary purpose of risk communication is to convey information that will be
clear, easily understood, and acted upon by those who have a stake in the
management of risk. However, by its very nature, information on risk inevitably
contains uncertainty.
A challenge for risk communicators is to explain the implications of uncertainty
for a variety of stakeholders, without further complicating or over-simplifying the
situation, which could result in misinterpretation and misunderstanding of the
risks and lead to inappropriate risk management decisions.
In addition to the nature and clarity of the information that is being delivered, a
critical factor that determines the effectiveness of risk communication is trust in
those who are delivering the message. Poor risk communication can lead to a
breakdown in trust, and a lack of trust can hamper any further attempts to
communicate information on risk.
This section explores the significance that trust and credibility has on the way
people perceive and respond to information on risk. In particular, it draws on
experiences with environmental and health risks that have generated public con-
troversies as a result of poor risk communication or distrust of those delivering
the message. It concludes with some of the key lessons to be learned about the
importance of building and maintaining trust to effectively communicate risk.
The significance of trust, credibility and openness
Sound health is the greatest of gifts; contentedness, the greatest of riches; trust,
the greatest of qualities. (The Buddha)
A dictionary definition of trust describes it as a firm belief in the reliability, hon-
esty, veracity and justice of a person or thing. It is manifested in the way in which
a person has confidence in another individual, organisation or system to behave
honourably.
Trust has been described as “a psychological state comprising the willingness to
accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behaviour
of another” (Rousseau et al, 1998).  Establishing trust is reliant on risk and interde-
pendence. Trust is established when there is a need for co-operation in overcoming
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or improving a situation. Risk creates an opportunity for trust to develop, which
leads to positive risk-taking. Trust would not be needed if actions could be under-
taken with complete certainty and no risk. As risk awareness and social inter-connec-
tivity increase, trust becomes an increasingly important social construct.
However, trust can be misplaced leading to negative consequences, as in the
case of fraud. Trust is essential to organisational life. Social relationships of all
types rely heavily on trust, and we depend on such relationships to collectively
manage uncertain situations such as natural hazard events.
Placing trust in a person or organisation enables an individual to deal with uncer-
tain situations in which there is reliance on others for their knowledge, expertise
and willingness to act in the best interests of that individual. An example is the
doctor-patient relationship, in which there is an imbalance of knowledge about
the risks of an illness or its treatment. In the absence of trust in the doctor’s
advice there are high costs associated with the patient obtaining the information
needed to make a choice of treatment, as well as the potentially high costs and
risks of making the wrong choice.
Trust is fragile. It is easily destroyed and requires significant effort to build,
rebuild and maintain. Some of the challenges include:
• Negative (trust-destroying) events are more noticeable and tend to influence
risk perception more than positive (trust-building) events.
• Sources of bad (trust-destroying) news tend to be seen as more credible than
sources of good news.
• Distrust, once initiated, tends to reinforce and perpetuate distrust (Slovic, 1999).
Negative responses to risks and a breakdown of trust arise where risks and
benefits of an activity are not clear or are perceived as unfairly distributed. Pre-
vailing popular opinions can also impact negatively on trust. For example, genetic
modification of food evokes strong feelings of distrust towards the proponents of
such technology because of concern about the uncertain, long-term environmen-
tal and health risks that outweigh any perceived benefits to society. On the other
hand, biotechnology is generally accepted, and even valued and those involved
trusted, when its application produces medical treatments that have widespread
benefits for society (e.g. insulin used for the treatment of diabetes).
Trustworthiness, credibility and openness are essential qualities for effective risk
communication. Studies have confirmed a strong correlation between the charac-
teristics of trust and credibility and their influence on risk perceptions (Trumbo
and McComas, 2003). Research indicates that people are more concerned about
risks when they do not trust the people or systems that manage them (HM
Treasury, 2005).
Others have described the key factors that determine trust and credibility as
knowledge and expertise, openness and honesty, and concern and care (Peters et
al., 1997). Other determinants include competence, caring and empathy, dedica-
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tion and commitment to due process and a desired goal, goodwill, and an ab-
sence of bias.
Trustworthiness is determined by the extent to which an audience perceives the
assertions made by a communicator to be honest, and this determines whether
or not the argument being presented is persuasive. Credibility is closely linked
with knowledge and expertise that determine the extent to which a risk commu-
nicator is perceived capable of making factual assertions (Frewer & Miles, 2003).
Well-meaning but false assurances can destroy trust. The British Government’s
handling of concerns about BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathy, or ‘mad
cow disease’) and its transmissibility to humans led to a significant loss of trust
in both the government and its advisers in the late 1980s and 1990s. A subse-
quent inquiry into the BSE incident concluded that the communication of the risk
posed by BSE to humans was poorly managed:
The increasing knowledge about BSE over the years, which threw
doubt on the theory that it would behave like scrapie, was not
concealed from the public. However, the public was not informed of
any change in the perceived likelihood that BSE might be transmis-
sible to humans. The public was repeatedly reassured that it was
safe to eat beef. Some statements failed to explain that the views
expressed were subject to proper observance of the precautionary
measures which had been introduced to protect human health against
the possibility that BSE might be transmissible. These statements
conveyed the message not merely that beef was safe but that BSE
was not transmissible. The impression thus given to the pubic that
BSE was not transmissible to humans was a significant factor lead-
ing to the public feeling of betrayal when it was announced on 20
March 1996 that BSE was likely to have been transmitted to people.
(BSE Report, 2000)
The BSE incident proved to be a turning point for the British Government’s ap-
proach to the use of science in policy-making and improving public confidence in
government’s ability to make sound decisions. The lessons learned from the BSE
crisis led to changes that saw more effort going into ensuring that advice to
government is based on sound evidence, and that it is timely, robust and capable
of standing up to challenges of credibility, reliability and objectivity.
Another case in Britain in the early 1990s highlighted poor quality decision-mak-
ing and a breakdown in trust in the health care system. It involved failure by
surgeons in the paediatric heart surgery at Bristol Infirmary to communicate accu-
rate information on the level of risk to which babies undergoing surgery were
being exposed.
An inquiry into the situation revealed a major failure of self-regulation with the
development of a ‘club culture’ amongst senior professionals, which meant that
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criticism and evidence of poor quality decision-making and preventable harm was
disregarded. There was a breach of trust as people in the service failed to work
together effectively for the interests of their patients.
The surgeons’ failure to communicate the risks left the parents feeling that their
consent was being falsely obtained (Alaszewski, 2002). A similar situation arose
in New Zealand in the 1980s when the Cartwright Inquiry revealed that many
women with major cervical abnormalities had been left untreated creating a ma-
jor breakdown in trust in senior medical professionals due to unethical practices
at National Women’s Hospital. The inquiry sparked a reform of patients’ rights in
New Zealand (Women’s Health Action Trust, 2007).
Uncertainty and trust – experts and laypeople
Risk is something we deal with every time we take a decision that involves
uncertainty (Eiser, 2004). Risk has two dimensions: the probability that some
event will occur, and the nature and extent (or seriousness) of the consequences
of that event if it does occur. There is usually uncertainty associated with both
these dimensions, as well as uncertainty about the links between cause and
effect.
Uncertainty is both a driver for researchers to find out more about a risk, and a
source of tension between those who assess risks and those who are exposed to
them. This reflects their different perspectives and behaviours. For example, sci-
entists will be familiar with uncertainty and will regard it as a fundamental reason
for the research that they undertake. On the other hand the public often seek
certainty and assurances of safety and are less willing to accept risk and potential
failure.
In the case of food risk uncertainty, Frewer et al. (2003) found that there is a
marked difference between the experts’ and the public’s conceptualisation of how
people will respond to information about scientific uncertainty. Experts appear to
believe that risk communication incorporating information about uncertainty will
have a negative impact on public risk perceptions.
In contrast, the ability of the public to conceptualise uncertainty appears not to
be an issue – they want much of the information on the scientific analysis to be
made available. It is the denial by experts of risk uncertainty that drives the
public’s distrust in science and scientific institutions. This has an important bear-
ing on how risk is communicated to different audiences.
One of the biggest challenges for risk communicators is that of presenting uncer-
tainty in a way that removes, rather than creates, confusion and conflict. Uncer-
tainty is inherent in risk assessment and must, therefore, be part of the accurate
communication of risk.
Science typically lies at the centre of political controversy and debate about risk,
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where those who advocate some line of action are likely to claim a scientific
justification for their position, while those opposing the action will either invoke
scientific uncertainty or competing scientific results to support their opposition
(Sarewitz, 2004).
Those who wish to either exaggerate or downplay risks can use uncertainty to do
so. Manipulation of uncertainty by powerful interest groups, as happened in the
case of the tobacco industry’s strategy to create uncertainty about the links be-
tween smoking and ill-health, has been used successfully to delay or block deci-
sions.
A similar approach can be seen in the debate over climate change. Despite the
overwhelming scientific evidence of global warming and its causes, some politi-
cally motivated groups have attempted to manipulate or distort scientific infor-
mation to show uncertainties where none actually exist.
Research into what the New Zealand public knows, thinks, and feels about sci-
ence found that a majority of New Zealanders are interested in at least some
aspects of science and technology, and are most interested in those areas where
personal and societal benefits are most evident (Hipkins et al., 2002). Some of
Case Study – The Manipulation of Uncertainty
In March 2004 the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) in the USA released a
report detailing examples of the distortion of scientific-based information
and the manipulation of documents to give the impression of considerable
uncertainty about climate change (UCS, 2004).
In a case detailed in the UCS report, the Bush administration was found to
have attempted to ‘substantially alter’  (p5) a section on climate change in a
US Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) draft Report on the Environ-
ment (USEPA, 2003). The White House Council on Environmental Quality and
the Office of Management and Budget are reported to have demanded altera-
tions to the USEPA document and the inclusion of “so many qualifying words
such as ‘potentially’ and ‘may’” that the result would have been to insert
“uncertainty…where there is essentially none” (p6). Rather than comply with
these demands, the entire section on climate change was deleted from the
USEPA report prior to its release for public comment; “agency staff chose this
path rather than compromising their credibility by misrepresenting the scien-
tific consensus” (p6).
This example highlights the vulnerability of scientific uncertainty to being
overplayed or underplayed in order to attain political advantage. Such ma-
nipulation has serious implications for the public and decision makers’ ac-
cess to “rigorous, objective scientific research and analysis” (p42) in order to
make informed risk management decisions (PCE, 2004).
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the relevant findings of the study included:
• New Zealanders are not inclined to take scientific claims on trust. They are
likely to judge research as irrelevant or unconvincing if they do not under-
stand the research methods and/or the meaning of evidence is not immedi-
ately apparent.
• People recognise that new developments in science and technology are im-
portant to New Zealand’s economy. However, there is concern about the con-
sequences of new developments in science and technology, which may be
partly related to personal values positions.
• There appears to be a high level of awareness about past dishonesties in
science internationally, particularly in relation to such things as the reporting
of health effects of smoking. Public relations approaches to socio-scientific
issues are treated with suspicion.
• Openness about uncertainty is seen as evidence of honesty on the part of
scientists. Open acknowledgement of areas of uncertainty and new questions
are preferable to bland assurances of safety or predictability.
• Health and environmental issues are both areas of high interest to New Zea-
landers. Some see a role for the government in funding basic research, and for
government control over scientists and their accountability to the public.
• People are discriminating of the sources of scientific information they will
trust. Professionals are trusted above all media sources. Politicians and lobby
groups are the least trusted sources of information about science issues.
A study by Johnson and Slovic (1995) into the effect of uncertainty on risk percep-
tion and trust concluded that prior trust or distrust in government, and public
attitudes towards authority, are dominant factors in the public’s perception of
risk, more so than uncertainty. Authorities’ discussion of uncertainty in their risk
estimates may be regarded by some as a sign of honesty, and by others as a sign
of incompetence.
The distinction depends on people’s familiarity with uncertainty in risk assess-
ment, and in science generally, as well as their prior experience of the authority’s
trustworthiness. The study emphasised that it is wrong to assume that ‘educat-
ing’ citizens on scientific uncertainty will be simple, or that explaining uncertain-
ties will improve public trust or knowledge.
In another study examining the views of scientific experts on how the public
conceptualise uncertainty (Frewer et al, 2003), many scientists thought that pro-
viding the public with information about uncertainty would increase distrust in
science and scientific institutions, as well as cause panic and confusion regarding
the extent and impact of a particular hazard.
This is consistent with the ‘deficit model’ of communicating with the general
public which seeks to ‘rectify’ the knowledge gap between those who have the
expertise in risk and those non-experts who are the recipients of the information.
In the deficit model of communication the difference in cognition and under-
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standing between expert and audience is regarded as a deficit on the part of the
audience, which could be corrected by the provision of more information from the
experts.
This is based on the assumption that, if only the information could be presented
in a simple and understandable way, the public could be ‘educated’ to accept
risks that they regard as unacceptable. The deficit model explains those situa-
tions where there are fundamental differences and a polarisation of views be-
tween expert elites and the general public. Any attempts to ‘dumb down’ risk
information in such situations can lead to further distrust and controversy.
Case Study – Risk Communication and Dialogue
Risk communication is increasingly relied on to resolve conflicts around tech-
nological risks. The genetic engineering debate in New Zealand, and else-
where, has demonstrated the potential for major public conflict in the rela-
tionship between science and society.
In 2002, the Ministry of Research, Science and Society (MORST) established
a Dialogue Fund to “develop pilot programmes that engage communities in
discussion over science and technology related issues that are, or may be-
come, a cause of tension between science and society; and to build im-
proved relationships between scientists and the community based on two-
way communication.”
Victoria University of Wellington (VUW) was funded to trial three new dia-
logue approaches using the genetic engineering (GE) debate as a case study.
The research assumed that, even though the discussion was difficult, there
were still opportunities to progress the debate on GE. While total agreement
may not be possible, it was suggested there was potential for greater con-
sensus than has been achieved to date and for enhanced policy outcomes.
Participants were recruited from two stakeholder groups:
1 Scientists working on genetic modification in the laboratory or as science
managers/marketers.
2 Members of community interest groups with concerns about the environ-
ment, Maori issues, trade and development, health, sustainable agricul-
ture or spiritual values.
The social discourse on GE is often constructed as a conflict between ‘sci-
ence’ and ‘society’, with homogeneous values and expectations within each
sector, and a wide divide between the two. It is often characterised in po-
lemical terms as:
• Rationality versus Emotion.
• Facts versus Fears.
• Experts versus Public.
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• Progress versus Obstruction.
Our project set out to explore what lies behind these apparently intractable
public positions, to develop approaches for reaching across the divide, and
to establish areas of commonality and opportunities for ongoing engage-
ment and exchange. It involved participants in an interactive process, testing
selected communication techniques in facilitated workshops.
Our first method, Appreciative Inquiry, has been used in organisational devel-
opment to enhance relationships between groups that want to work together
more effectively. It puts the focus on solutions rather than problems, and
invites participants to consider what has worked well in the past in their
relationships and take that into the future. The second approach, termed The
Civil Conversation, applies approaches from interpersonal conflict resolution
to conflict around issues in the public domain. Protagonists are brought
together to explore values and perspectives around controversial public is-
sues. The method was developed in New Zealand by Rhonda Pritchard.
The final approach, Issues Mapping, was developed using the ‘mental mod-
els’ concept developed by Morgan et al (2002) in risk communication. Tradi-
tional risk communication was based on a deficit model, in which the risk
‘perceptions’ of the public were compared with the ‘actual’ risks identified by
experts.  The challenge was to close the gap between public fears and the
technical facts, through the use of communication techniques. Issues Map-
ping assumes that all stakeholders frame risk based on the social construc-
tion of the issues and their role in the discussion; and that the communica-
tion task is to establish a process that elucidates and enhances a multilateral
conversation around all the elements of risk that may be identified.
We created a representation of the issues from the point of view of the ‘lay
public’ and then developed a similar representation from ‘the experts’. The
framing of scientists and the community about GE risks was presented graphi-
cally and fed back to workshop participants as an aid to discussion. We used
a graphic scale to show the ranges of acceptance among participants of
different forms and uses of GM; and modelled a ‘landscape’ of the issues in
terms of how central or peripheral they were to where participants stood in
the debate.
All three methods involve a face-to-face conversation between participants
representing different points of view. The key elements of the process in-
cluded:
• Small group discussions in a structured setting.
• Use of an expert facilitator.
• Establishing rules for the conversation, including confidentiality and re-
spect.
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• Use of active skills in asking questions and listening.
• A focus on dialogue rather than debate – on exploration of a range of
world views, rather than the imposition of a single, ‘correct’ position.
• A search for common ground rather than a focus on differences.
This was only a pilot project, conducted in a limited time span with just one
session. We nevertheless found that considerable progress could be made in
moving the discourse from debate and into dialogue.
Participants were able to identify considerable common ground and found
that a dialogue setting allowed them to move out of the entrenched posi-
tions they normally occupied in the public domain. For example, there was a
clear overlap in the acceptability of different levels of containment for geneti-
cally modified organisms.
They also indicated a strong preference for using these forms of communica-
tion in the future.
Our report (Cronin, 2005) presents detailed information on the social, eco-
nomic, cultural and environmental risks of GM as perceived by the various
participants, and on their experience of communication around the topic of
GM.
Our key findings were:
• The debate is not as polarized as depicted by the media.
• Traditional stereotypes do not apply.
• Both groups place a high priority on the environment.
• They differ over the importance of ethical and spiritual issues.
• There is a common mistrust of the ‘profit motive’ in modern science.
• Both scientists and community interest group members want better forms
of dialogue, and more information from each other and from the govern-
ment.
Karen Cronin
In whom do we trust?
Various studies have examined the institutions or individuals that people trust
most. Trumbo & McConas (2003) report that people typically perceive physicians,
friends and environmental groups as the most credible sources of information.
A United Kingdom Parliamentary report (House of Lords, 2000) refers to a number
of quantitative and qualitative surveys carried out there. In one survey, respond-
ents were asked which among a range of scientists they would have the most
confidence in to tell them the truth about BSE and the safety of nuclear power
stations. In both cases the rank order by popularity of first choice was:
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1 a scientist working in a university;
2 a scientist working in industry;
3 a scientist working in a non-government institution; and
4 (last) a scientist working in a government department.
Another survey of public attitudes to risk suggests that government scientists
enjoy less trust than independent scientists or pressure groups, but more than
private companies or government ministers (House of Lords, 2000).
As a note of caution in interpreting such surveys, terms such as ‘risk’ and ‘trust’
may mean different things to different people and in different contexts. For exam-
ple, the term ‘we trust you’ may mean a number of things, including:
• we believe you can give us the right answers and reliable information;
• we believe that you are honest, and will tell us all you know;
• we trust your judgement and rely on you for decisions which are wise, impar-
tial, ethical and in the public interest; or
• we may trust you in one of these ways, without trusting you in the others.
(House of Lords, 2000)
The culture of secrecy within public and private organisations has a significant
effect on trust, particularly on issues of risk involving novel science and research,
and a lot of uncertainty, assumptions, complexity and disagreement around the
risks. In contrast, trust is built up through efforts to inform, and attempts to
understand people’s attitudes, values and ethics through dialogue.
A study of the role of trust in information sources in risk communication (Frewer
& Miles, 2003) examined whether, in the case of food scares, trust differs be-
tween different sources of information. The study surveyed over 200 people and
found that, in relation to food risks, medical sources were more trusted than
government sources, and that industry sources were least trusted to convey infor-
mation about risks to the public. This was thought to be due to a number of food
scares in the mid- to late-1990s.
Key lessons about the role of trust in risk communication
Public trust can only be established if communications about risk are frank and
objective [and] in particular, there must be openness about uncertainty. (Lord
Phillips, in Report on BSE, 2000)
Various studies and examples highlighted above present evidence that trust is
essential to effectively communicate information on risks and to influence deci-
sions to act upon such information. Trust encourages co-operative behaviour,
reduces harmful conflict, decreases transaction costs and promotes effective re-
sponses to crises.
The lessons about building and maintaining trust to be an effective risk commu-
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nicator can be summarised as follows:
• It is important to plan ahead, identify the issues and engage with stakeholders
(interested or affected parties) as early as possible. Stakeholders will want to
be, and should be, involved in the decision-making process and to share their
concerns and ideas. Early stakeholder engagement also identifies where the
current evidence base is weak and should be strengthened by investment in
further research.
• Risk is about uncertainty and incomplete information. Under these circum-
stances it is important to get a wide range of advice from the best sources.
Uncertainty is not the same as incompetence. Where there are uncertainties
they should always be acknowledged and attempts made to better under-
stand and reduce them.
• Official admissions of uncertainty can be more favourably received and trusted
by the public than efforts to deny risks exist. Uncertainty should be explicitly
identified and communicated directly in plain language. The difficulties asso-
ciated with presenting uncertain, incomplete or conflicting conclusions should
not be underestimated. However, suppressing uncertainty is more likely to
lead to a significant loss of public trust and respect.
• Stakeholders should be provided with as much information as possible. In
doing so, stakeholders should be asked what information they need and how
they wish to be informed. Attempts to filter out apparently complex informa-
tion or to over-simplify it should be avoided.
• People and organisations will respond differently to advice they receive about
risk. Their responses to risk will largely depend on the trust they place on
those who communicate risk information. Sometimes the issues which experts
regard as vital may not always be the ones that most concern the public.
Effective engagement on risks between experts, the public and decision mak-
Case Study – Defying the Negative Stereotype
Surveys in the USA have shown a long-term decline in public confidence and
trust in social institutions, especially government and industry. Correspond-
ing to this decline in institutional credibility has been the rise of citizen
environmental groups. A study of critical factors affecting public perceptions
of trust and credibility for three different sectors – citizen groups, industry
and government – found that defying a negative stereotype is key to improv-
ing perceptions of trust and credibility. In the case of citizen groups, they
were perceived to lack specialised knowledge and expertise. To address this
negative stereotypical image and improve perceptions of trust and credibility,
these groups were advised to improve their knowledge and expertise capa-
bilities. Similarly, industry is perceived to care only about profits, and needs
to address this by improving the public perception of its concern and care
about risk issues. In the case of government, the focus should be on improv-
ing the public perception of its commitment to managing risk (Peters et al.,
1997).
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ers requires a free flow of meaningful information, a commitment to under-
standing others’ points of view, and a willingness to seek realistic risk man-
agement solutions.
• While trust is important in risk communication, it is not a substitute for critical
analysis of risks and how they should be managed. Trusting too much (over-
trust), or misplaced trust can be dangerous and exacerbate inappropriate
behaviour.
• Risk assessments presented to decision makers should include scientific evi-
dence as well as information on differing perspectives of risk (including public
perception of the risk). Values are also important to consider. All such material
should be freely available to all stakeholders. Procedures for obtaining advice
should be open and transparent.
• Risk experts should not be pressed to come to firm conclusions that cannot
be justified by the evidence available. It is important to distinguish between
the responsibility of experts to provide advice, and the responsibility of deci-
sion makers for actions taken as a result of that advice.
In general, the decisions we take on risks are based on the information that we
receive, the status of the person who gives us the information, our previous
experience of the issue, and what our expectations are. When information is
incomplete we rely on the opinions of others in whom we trust. We trust people
Case Study – Eradication of an Insect and an Erosion of Trust
In 2002 the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) carried out the aerial
application of Foray 48B over western Auckland in an effort to eradicate the
painted apple moth, which posed a major threat to commercial forestry and
native trees. Foray 48B is a commercial insecticide that contains Bacillus
thuringiensis (Bt) as its active ingredient.
Although Foray 48B is considered generally to be safe to use, independent
health risk assessments of the insecticide prior to its use by MAF identified
potential effects such as short-term irritation and worsening of pre-existing
conditions such as allergies and asthma. A later study of the literature indi-
cated that Bt products have the potential to cause health impacts in sensitive
individuals (Hales et al, 2004).
The aerial application method created concern among residents about the
consultation process leading up to the decision to spray as well as the po-
tential health risks of the insecticide.
Delays by MAF in deciding what course of action to take following discovery
of the moth led to hostility and suspicion towards MAF by the time it had
announced that a spray programme was necessary. People in the community
expected to be consulted but initially they were poorly informed. MAF’s initial
response to residents’ concerns was to downplay any likely danger to health
from the spray.
41
Getting the Message Environment Right
we know well and who share our views.
We are less likely to trust people we do not know or those who seem to have
conflicts of interest. The key to successful information flows is therefore trust.
However, trust is fragile and is easily destroyed if those who are communicating
the information are considered to be unreliable, or are perceived to lack knowl-
edge and expertise, openness and honesty, concern and care, and a commitment
to addressing the risk.
During the spray programme MAF set up a health monitoring and advisory
service to deal with any health-related concerns. But this did little to allay
concerns. Residents were suspicious, expressed little confidence in the effec-
tiveness, impartiality and fairness of such a service, and many were reluctant
to use it.
An article by a local councillor who examined the lessons learned from the
communication between MAF and the community made the following obser-
vation:
It is a mistake to think that the community could not under-
stand complex scientific information, and things are ‘dumbed
down’ to the point of being useless. Most community members
who are interested in an issue will digest huge quantities of
information. The last thing anyone wants to hear is, “trust us –
we know what is good for you”. That sets off immediate alarm
bells. Quality information and well-informed community leaders
can help break down today’s mistrust of scientists. People want
to know where to go for truly independent health advice. (Hulse,
2005, p6)
This case highlights a situation in which health effects linked to the spraying
programme were difficult to prove, and despite all the assurances about the
safety of the spray and the establishment of a health advisory service there
remained a lack of trust in those who were communicating the information
on risk. This was due partly to distrust of a government agency whose pri-
mary responsibility was to ensure the eradication a forest pest, and partly to
residents’ indignation at not having any real choice about the situation and
believing that their concerns were not respected.
With wisdom, patience and respect from the beginning, trust
can be earned. True partnership with the community can only
exist with this trust. When a spray programme is necessary it
must be conducted in partnership with the community involved
– otherwise it becomes a war! (Hulse, 2005, p7)
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Informing and Empowering
New Zealanders live in a country at risk from natural disasters. Fortunately we can
educate people about the actions they can take to ameliorate the effects of these
disasters. In an ideal world, having learned what they can do about minimising
the consequences of natural disasters, all households in New Zealand will secure
their homes, put together a survival kit and develop a disaster plan for their
family. If only it were that straightforward.
Natural disaster risk communicators (at least those who wish to encourage peo-
ple to take steps to prepare for such events) often tread a fine line between
generating fear and indifference, both of which can lead to inaction. And of
course there is no guarantee that steering a middle course will deliver the desired
results either.
One of New Zealand’s primary resources for natural disaster risk communication
is the Earthquake commission (EQC). EQC provides advice to New Zealanders on
natural hazard protection and insurance to residential property owners for dam-
age caused by a variety of natural hazards. EQC is a crown entity that was estab-
lished in 1945. One of EQC’s roles, as set out in its legislation, is to facilitate
research and education about matters relevant to natural disaster damage and its
mitigation.
While EQC provides insurance for damage caused by earthquakes, landslips, tsu-
namis, hydrothermal activity and volcanic eruptions, its public education activity
has concentrated largely on earthquakes. This is because they are frequent, have
the potential to cause widespread damage and homeowners can do many things
themselves to reduce or prevent quake damage to their property. Of course if
they have home and contents insurance, people will have EQC cover, but no
amount of insurance will make up for the inconvenience of broken appliances or
the heartbreak of broken heirlooms.
In its research, EQC has found that people’s interpretation of risk messages influ-
ences whether or not they take action to mitigate the risk, although interpretation
of risk is by no means the only factor that comes into the decision-making proc-
ess. This is not rocket science, but it still presents a significant challenge.
One interpretation of risk is that the probability is too remote to warrant taking
any action to mitigate against damage. A second is espoused by those people
who don’t deny the odds, but assume that the damage will be so catastrophic
that there’s not much point in doing anything to mitigate. Quite often they would
prefer not to think about it.
There are of course many people who fall somewhere between the two extremes,
who agree that the risk is there and that there are things they ought to do to
mitigate it. However, there are a number of reasons why mitigation is never ticked
off the ‘To Do’ list; for example, there are always other things that need doing first
or it is difficult to find out exactly what to do and to do it, or it is too expensive.
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Consequently, it is never a matter of just educating people about the risk and the
mitigation measures they can take. The messages must also aim to counter one
or more of the barriers to action.
From the latter half of the 1990s the EQC’s public education programme has incor-
porated a range of media and approaches in order to ensure the messages cut
through to as many people as possible and help overcome some of the barriers.
The language EQC uses to convey a message, whether about risk or mitigation,
aims to be simple and concise. Since one of the barriers to taking action is that
it’s too difficult to do, it is crucial that its education material is easy to under-
stand. To draw on a cliché, a picture is worth a thousand words. So when EQC
provides information on how to quake safe a home and its contents, it usually
includes images. In television advertising in particular, this can prove a difficult
idea to impress upon the ‘creatives’ who may object to the inclusion of prosaic
scenes with Blu Tack (a malleable, reusable non-marking adhesive). However, the
purpose of the exercise is to educate, not to create the perfect advertisement.
To show that the risk of natural disaster damage is real, EQC has used:
1 Television advertisements showing a banner running across the landscape,
metaphorically bringing the underlying faults to the surface – it is all too easy
to ignore the fact that our lives are played out on the constantly moving
boundary of two tectonic plates.
2 Television advertisements showing that the risk of experiencing a damage-
causing quake is as great or greater than other risks that we routinely mitigate
against such as burglary or car accidents.
3 Brochures showing how likely a damage-causing quake is in different areas of
the country.
4 Television and newspaper advertising illustrating the risk natural disasters
pose to family and precious possessions.
5 School resource kits which target children, who in turn discuss with their
parents what needs to be done at home.
6 Display stands that can be sent throughout the country and at times when
local awareness is high, e.g. during Safety Week or the Hawke’s Bay earth-
quake anniversary.
To communicate that while the risk is real, it can and should be managed, EQC
has employed:
1 Television advertisements providing simple advice on how to mitigate e.g.
‘Fix. Fasten. Forget.’ commercials.
2 School resource kits.
3 EQ-IQ website which has more detailed information than generally can be
included in advertising material.
4 ‘Quake Safe’ brochures delivered to every household from Hamilton southwards.
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5 Display stands.
EQC’s most recent television commercials show a banner running across the
landscape, metaphorically bringing the underlying faults to the surface.
Empowering new migrant Chinese
The good sense of providing material on risk and risk management in the first
language of people and in ways that suit their culture is obvious, but what is less
obvious is that the message itself may need to be specially designed as well.
A good case in point is communicating with new migrant Chinese in New Zealand.
Of the well over 100,000 ethnic Chinese in New Zealand, more than 80,000 were
born overseas and the vast majority of these are relatively recent migrants to New
Zealand.  Most speak one of the Chinese dialects as their first language and may
not have a very good grasp of spoken English, let alone written English.
Although they may speak a different dialect, ethnic Chinese typically read in the
same traditional Chinese script. It follows that it makes sense to communicate
with this group in written form, i.e. in Chinese script.  However, what about the
message itself?  Is it just a matter of translating the messages used for the
majority of New Zealanders?
Through community feedback EQC realised that the overall approach to take was
one of reassurance.  These were not people who needed to be jolted out of their
complacency. They were already sensitised to the general risk; they just wanted
to know what decisions they could make to lessen or negate it.
One of the first things Chinese migrants typically want to do when they arrive is
buy a home.  However, they are likely to have heard that New Zealand is prone to
earthquakes and other natural disasters and they want to make sure that they
buy a safe place in a safe area.
The first imperative then was to explain that while natural disasters are a feature
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of life in New Zealand because of its geologically active nature, people have
learnt to live with them.
The second imperative was to explain that New Zealand has good systems in
place to ensure that houses are not likely to be permitted in high-risk zones and
that the houses are built to standards that take natural disasters into account.  It
was explained how building standards had improved over the years.
The new migrant Chinese needed to be reassured that they could trust the sys-
tem.  It was therefore not a matter so much for them to work out what were the
safe areas and what was a safe type of house, but to be reassured that they
could, with some prudence, buy just about anywhere.
EQC advised that there were various services available to help prospective buyers
make their decisions – for example, city and district councils through the provi-
sion of Land Information Memoranda (LIMs), property lawyers, and accredited
building advisers.  EQC also advised that there were systems and services in
place when disasters did occur including Civil Defence and EQC itself.
To do this, EQC has produced a range of material (a brochure, website material,
press advertisements and articles) in Chinese that outlines the risks people living
in New Zealand face, how risk is managed by society (e.g. EQC’s insurance) and
what people can do themselves to mitigate the risk to their property.
Knowledge is indeed power.  Knowledge enables people to act with confidence,
based on the understanding that they have been well-informed and have the
facts before them. EQC’s programme for the new migrant Chinese community was
designed to do exactly that on the particular subject of property and natural
disaster in New Zealand.
Establishing trust and providing education are core tools in evolving risk commu-
nication. New Zealanders are fortunate that with our high exposure to natural
hazards, research into understanding, predicting and mitigating risks is highly
advanced. Councils and infrastructure owners have a wealth of tools available to
manage these risks.
Additionally they have obligations that require them to manage their risk expo-
sure. Conversely, at a community level, familiarity with minor natural hazard events
often leads to complacency among populations that are exposed to some of
these risks. Multiple small events that have been experienced with little problem
are more prevalent than larger less frequent events that require preparation and
mitigation.
Many New Zealanders have experienced or know people who have experienced
natural hazard events. Trust in past experiences, expectations from government
entities and ‘common sense’ all contribute to the way messages on preparation
and mitigation are received by the public. Similarly, organisations with access to
technical risk data may have quite different expectations from the public. Risk
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communication provides a means of better aligning the expectations of organisa-
tions and the public, but in order to get appropriate action the message environ-
ment must be right.
It is essential for risk practitioners to establish the level of understanding and
misconceptions that are present. This will shape what the various stakeholders
consider reasonable for them and others to do. Councils around the country
continue to work with their communities  in order to raise risk awareness and to
understand what their communities expectations are.
Case Study – Eastern Bay of Plenty Floods 2004
Flooding in Eastern Bay of Plenty in July 2004 impacted on much of the
Rangitaiki Plains and parts of the Whakatane Township. In total 2,552
people became evacuees during the emergency, over 500 homes were
damaged and some 450 farms and lifestyle blocks were affected.
A CAE risk communication case study following the floods explored the appre-
ciation of the risks and effectiveness of flooding risk communication in the area.
Early in the study the various stakeholders and their risk communication
relationships were identified. These were expressed as follows (see Figure
3.1):
• The top tier boxes represent ‘Exposure Stakeholder’ – those exposed to
flooding risks and how these risks affect them.
EQC’s ‘Easy Ways to Quake Safe your Home’ brochure has been translated
into Chinese and is available on EQC’s website (www.eqc.govt.nz)
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• The bottom tier boxes represent ‘Activity Stakeholder’ – those organisa-
tions that undertake some action with regards to the risk and in what
phases they most actively engage in risk communication with the risk
exposed.
• The middle tier boxes represent both information sources and organisa-
tions that act as a medium for risk communication between the exposure
and activity stakeholders or alternatively as sources of information re-
layed to those exposed to the risks.
The key stakeholder groups identified were loosely classified as ‘Residents’,
and ‘Local Government’. These were identified as the stakeholders that had
the greatest interest in communicating needs and desires about flood man-
agement to each other on a daily basis. Following identification of key
stakeholders a series of surveys were conducted to draw out risk percep-
tions, understanding and how these stakeholders communicate about flood-
ing risks.
Prior to the floods the various district councils communicated hazard infor-
mation to the public as part of their newsletters and websites. In addition,
efforts to engage face-to-face with members of the community at events was
also undertaken, including through regular river scheme meetings.
During the flood response the local government attitude was one of informa-
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tion dissemination. The use of fliers was initiated by local government in
order to share information and advise specific communities. Normal means
of dissemination (New Zealand Post) proved unviable for conveying targeted
information to specific areas of the community. The result was that local
volunteers distributed the fliers and the information was also relayed through
1XX transmissions.
Two way public communication was managed predominantly by the local
radio station 1XX, which they have received recognition for. The police recom-
mended to people that contacted them to contact 1XX with information and
to get updates on the situation from the radio station. People were able to
call into the radio station with situational information and the like and this
information was then transmitted to all those listening. 1XX operated as a
call centre with three receptionists fielding calls 24 hours per day for the
duration of the flooding. This resource provided real-time updates on events
and public warnings additional to those that were issued by the CDEM Con-
troller through the Public Information Manager.
Overall, residents were satisfied with local government performance and com-
munication. Some were not satisfied with the timeliness of specific action but
appreciated the reasoning behind delayed decisions. Additionally, residents
were satisfied with their own understanding and level of preparedness for
flooding. Minimal changes to their levels of personal preparation for emer-
gencies have been made since the floods.
In contrast to residents’ opinions, local government believed that the com-
munities were neither well prepared nor able to respond well to flooding
events. Primarily a lack of personal home preparedness was cited. This stark
contrast of these views with respect to flooding risks shows that there is still
work to be done on improving risk communication in this area.
Adapted from Hoskin (2006a)
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4 Planning & DeliverySharon Cuzens, Dan Coward, Chris Galloway,
Ernesto Henriod, Kristin Hoskin, Derek Selkeld & Mike Wood
Developing a Strategy
Risk communication strategies may have to do with questions of efficiency – how
can we communicate so as to give us the greatest possible chance of achieving
our objectives? – and also with positioning the organisation. For example, when
risk management and communication is the focus, a strategy may aim to optimise
compliance with procedures that are designed to minimise the potential for an
identified risk to be realised. Such an occurrence could damage the organisation’s
interests and so limit its ability to fulfil its mission.
If crisis communication is the concern, a strategy may have to do with how the
organisation can confront this challenge so that it achieves a pre-determined
goal. This, for example, may include being seen by important audiences as a
company that is prepared to put customers’ well-being ahead of its own when
their health has been compromised.
Leaders know that “a crisis is a risk manifested” (Heath, 2006) and that crises
and risks must be covered by appropriate strategies.
Strategies vary greatly. Some are very precisely defined and imposed top-down
through organisational hierarchies. Others emerge in a more evolutionary and co-
operative way from discussions, experiments and learning. In either case, taking
a strategic approach should ensure that decisions on strategic direction, and
communication design and delivery are seen as an end-to-end process of change
management, with constant testing, feedback, learning and improvement. All strat-
egies need to be adaptable, with quick feedback and effective information flows
to respond to new information, and to take account of changing circumstances or
unexpected events.
Strategies are not the same as tactics, which are the specific actions one takes in
support of strategy implementation. For example, if an internal risk management
strategy calls for face-to-face communication because it is considered this ap-
proach will work best, tactics will be personal briefings or small team meetings,
usually led by team members’ immediate supervisor or manager.
In contrast, a strategy needs to have a vision of a desired future. Strategies
explain why particular steps are taken. In implementing an action plan, it is
important to ensure that these actions remain ‘strategic’ – that is, that they
continue to contribute to achieving the desired outcome.
Sustaining strategic confidence may be a matter of funding ongoing research to
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enable risk communicators to make adjustments as they go, adapting to the
findings. For example, if research shows that one message approach is working
better than another, communicators can either make adjustments or drop the less
productive message design.
The key is flexibility, although this is easier to prescribe than to demonstrate.
Sometimes organisational ‘silos’ – internal structures, workflows, policies and
procedures – stand in the way of optimal adaptability to changing circumstances.
However, the ability to adjust is an essential component of strategy. Scholars of
organisational strategic planning identify two key ways that organisations de-
velop strategy. One is through formal processes, often (in larger organisations)
led by staff members responsible for the annual strategic plan, which becomes a
document presented to the board for signoff.
The other way, and one that recognises the uncertainty associated with seeking
to manage risk, is through the pattern of responses an organisation makes as it
responds to internal and external changes.
If an organisation has developed a strategic framework within which these re-
sponses can be made, it has a better chance of achieving goals than one that is
trying to make circumstances conform to its predetermined plan.
For example, in a crisis, a determination to be seen as putting people first
becomes a strategic framework within which decisions can be made. If a particu-
lar action is recommended, such as closing a factory after a fire and laying off
staff until repairs can be made, the strategic framework becomes a litmus test:
will such a step lead to us being viewed as we would wish to be seen by our
publics?
Use of message maps
Vincent Covello, of the US Center for Risk Communication, developed a technique
that helps ensure that organisational messaging remains strategic. He originated
the use of ‘message maps’ – visual aids that give at a glance the organisation’s
messages in relation to high concern or controversial issues. Such at-a-glance
accessibility can be important not only in managing risks, but also when a crisis
occurs.
Using a message map helps to control most communication situations by helping
to know what to say while reaching the audience with what they want, or need,
to hear in an honest, straightforward manner.
The idea aims to display complex information in detailed, hierarchically organised
responses to questions or concerns the organisation expects to arise. The re-
sponses are ranked according to their significance using an ‘inverted pyramid’ of
importance. Message maps help develop a group of consistent messages and
ensure that the messages are transmitted with a single voice.
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Messages are laid out in a matrix and the process of developing them is consid-
ered as important as the finished product, as it helps mesh different sets of
expertise, knowledge and opinion into a form that is easy to use consistently.
According to Covello, it is important in writing message maps to think of answers
to possible questions from the perspectives of the publics that may be asking
them, rather than from that of the organisation that is providing the responses.
He suggests message maps should be based on three short sentences that con-
vey three key messages in only 27 words. Ideally they will be memorable too.
Message maps can be used as a checklist to ensure all relevant messages have
been identified and crafted in a form that will be understood easily. Often the lack
of information in a message map is an early pointer to the lack of information in
the message itself, so the process of developing the map offers opportunities to
rectify any gaps in the information over time. They are also a useful tool for
spokespeople media training, helping concentrate on the key issues and outlin-
ing any supporting material.
Covello says that message maps should not be regarded as fixed once they have
been developed. Rather, they should be adjusted as new information becomes
available. While message maps will help ensure consistent messaging, keeping
them fresh is vital: reporters may come up with angles the organisation has not
anticipated, despite its best efforts (see Table 4.1).
A consistent message
Maintaining message consistency can be a challenge. One of the authors tried to
ensure consistency when managing a crisis that occurred when a utility work crew
cut a major cable. However he was desk-bound as his phone rang non-stop: the
local newspaper went to the pit where the crew was working, and got a story
directly, undermining corporate control efforts.
The same challenge can arise when a blogger with inside sources posts material
that contradicts the official version of how a risk is being handled or a crisis
managed.
Consistency is valuable, because when people hear about or read about the
organisation either via the mass media or in their social networks, they are likely
to recall the most recent information or opinion they received.
An organisational message sustained in a stable way over time is more likely to
be remembered. Sometimes, the message needs to be not only that of the or-
ganisation in the eye of a media storm, but also that of the sector to which the
organisation belongs. If a major risk event has occurred, it can undermine trust in
an entire industry, not just the company most directly involved. In this case, the
company needs help and can partner with peers, even competitors, in the longer-
term interests of the sector.
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Industry associations or sector groups may be able to play a co-ordinating role,
but only if they have planned to do so beforehand – and have, ideally, engaged
group members in simulation exercises. Both the company concerned and its
partners need to have invested time in building up credibility in the eyes of those
whose good opinion is important to their success.
This means more than ensuring that corporate actions are seen to be consistent
with corporate messages, important though this is. It means especially that the
organisation itself is seen as a legitimate part of the community, one that makes
a valued contribution. If the organisation’s own legitimacy is in question, it will
face great difficulty in recovering from a risk event, particularly if the public
suspects that negligence is involved. For example, a chemical company that has
not invested in strong community outreach programmes may find itself facing
calls for greater regulatory oversight of its operations or even closure if an un-
planned release of toxic substances occurs.
In responding to such challenges, an organisation under fire needs to work with
some established ground rules as it responds, together with other industry par-
ticipants, to criticism from a risk-concerned public.
Communication needs to be as open as reasonable commercial confidentiality
considerations will allow, and channelled through agreed spokespeople who work
to common media release protocols. These protocols might cover not only what
can be said but also what the parties have agreed cannot be said – at least
without clearance from regulatory or legal sources.
There should be consultation and brainstorming about how complex, scientific
Key message 1 
Our engineers have been 
monitoring the area for the 
past five years and say the 
risk is slight. 
 
Key message 2 
This does not mean we think 
the risk is zero, so after the 
recent rains we have been 
monitoring the area 
continuously. 
Key message 3 
We believe that our 
precautions will allow us to 
detect any significant 
movement in enough time to 
act. 
Supporting fact 1.1 
We now have enough data to 
be able to make sound 
predictions as to the likelihood 
of any movement after heavy 
rain. 
Supporting fact 2.1 
Our sensitive instruments are 
being backed up by regular 
site inspections. 
Supporting fact 3.1 
We believe that the 
combination of steps we have 
taken will allow us to act in 
good time if the unlikely event 
of a subsidence does occur. 
Supporting fact 1.2 
… 
Supporting fact 2.2 
… 
Supporting fact 3.2 
… 
Supporting fact 1.3 
… 
Supporting fact 2.3 
… 
Supporting fact 3.3 
… 
Based on Covello, 2002 
Table 4.1: Stakeholder Question or Concern: Possibility of land
subsidence after unusually heavy rain
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material can best be communicated to people who may have little appetite for
information scientists consider important. They may simply be looking for a ‘bot-
tom line’ reassurance that they face little or no danger.
Timing questions should also be agreed: how often will the parties release infor-
mation, over what period? These are media relations strategy questions that
demand co-ordination and co-operation: no easy task when all parties may be
under intense scrutiny, even as they confront a major operational or naturally
caused crisis.
Presenting the Message
Empathy
The definition of empathy ‘is the ability to empathise’, which is understanding
and sharing the feelings of others, a cornerstone of being able to present an
effective message, knowing and acknowledging your audience. Basically people
want to know you care before they will care what you know.
The use of empathy in presenting a message can have both positive and negative
outcomes. Empathy can lead towards the beginnings of a good working relation-
ship, often leaving people feeling as though they are valued and that their mes-
sage is received.
The risk associated with empathy may be that more time is spent on preparing an
inclusive message than on presenting the whole message.
Risk or hazards associated with empathy
When using empathy as a tool to present a message it is essential to consider the
potential for:
• becoming confused with the endorsement of a particular subject within your
presentation;
• forgetting what to say because you focus on what the other party is saying;
and/or
• working out how long to invest in communicating with some people, if you
identify that they do not respond to empathy or this approach.
These potential problems could affect the effectiveness of delivering the message
and must be recognised when developing a presentation strategy.
Positives of empathy within your presentation
If used correctly, empathy can help with the delivery of key points within a pres-
entation, often leaving the audience supportive and understanding of the organi-
sational message.
A positive outcome can be a higher level of organisational understanding of the
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audience concerns, which can shape and influence future presentations, organi-
sational support and direction – “Empathic acknowledging can satisfy people’s
needs to reveal aspects of their inner world to others and to have their revela-
tions acknowledged” (Bookbinder, 2005).
Meeting the needs of the media
The media are key stakeholders in risk communication, whether or not they send
out the ‘right’ message, or the message you want them to send. Organisations
involved in risk communication are scrutinised closely by the media and, ulti-
mately, the wider public. Managing the format and message with the media re-
quires a range of tools and skills, organisational accountability and policy.
Knowing the media
Why do we need to meet the needs of the media? The media can shape and
influence public opinion about the message we want portrayed. Although you
may know the message you want to portray, this may not be the one portrayed by
the media if no process or an inappropriate process has been followed or estab-
lished within your organisation when dealing with them.
An essential element to meeting the needs of the media is understanding their
needs:
A reporter’s job is news, not education, events not issues or princi-
ples. (Sandman, 1986)
The media’s main value to you is to keep the browsers adequately
informed and to keep them feeling adequately informed. (Sandman,
2003)
Whatever view, the media is a tool for risk communication. What makes news for
media is conflict or drama, human interest, an angle or relevance. It is through
this that an organisation’s successes and failures can be portrayed. Successful
risk communication will draw on competencies, unsuccessful on incompetencies.
Just as important as understanding the media’s needs is to understand the needs
of its audience:
Words and media are important but so too are the diverse range of
priorities and attitudes among those involved. (Jasanoff et al, 1995)
It is through the media that the message can be delivered to the intended audi-
ence. Use the wrong medium and your message may be lost.
Tools and skills for meeting media needs
The media will want to capture everything that is said or made available. Several
simple tools can be applied to the information you wish to portray to meet their
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needs when providing information.
1. Create an easy-to-find online outlet. If utilising an electronic medium to com-
municate risk, an online outlet enables information to be updated regularly.
The media can then access this information and receive automatic updates.
This is particularly important during any long duration operation where key
messages may need to be passed on regularly or if public and media interest
is high. For example, a major roading upgrade affecting traffic at specific
places and times may change daily.
2. Use a number of formats. The media is dynamic in the way it collects and
disseminates its views through various forms, e.g. local paper, international
press and specialist topic papers. Each media agent will have a format it
requires for collecting this information. A common fault with a media release
from an organisation is the use of the PDF format – editable content that can
be easily imported is much preferred. Ensuring that when releasing informa-
Case Study – Change Management
Change management often conjures up fears and instability, and is often
misunderstood by those who do not understand what the objective is. Within
risk communication, there is an element of change management when pre-
senting a message – a risk exists, there is a solution to mitigate it, but
changes are required. Using empathy to present a message can mitigate the
concerns of the audience.
Recently faced with a risk-based change to resourcing within a number of fire
brigades of the New Zealand Fire Service, the project team leader looked at
what role empathy could play in presenting the message.
The main approach undertaken to make these changes was based on com-
municating directly with the brigades to demonstrate ownership of the deci-
sion and begin the process of mitigating concerns or answering questions.
The process involved establishing the brigades’ concerns with the entire
process of resourcing – from testing, maintenance, standardisation within
geographic clusters to the use of resources within their communities. Estab-
lishing these concerns helped managers understand how to present the
message that acknowledged their concerns, using empathy to establish a
relationship. With a relationship established, being able to offer up solutions
to the concerns of the brigades helped focus on the larger need to change
resourcing and the supporting structures of testing, maintenance, etc.
Staying focused throughout the process of communicating the risk-based
resourcing model, and using empathy to connect with the brigades, resulted
in an acceptance of the change. This empathetic method has left a number of
the brigades with ownership of the change, as they have felt part of the
process and understand the logic surrounding the change.
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tion to the media some consideration is given to the format will enhance any
working relationship and assist with putting the message across.
3. Ensure accurate contact information is provided on every media release. To
ensure the continuity of information flow and to give the media a contact
point for further clarification, comment or additional information, ensure the
contact details of the most appropriate person in the organisation is on each
release. This may be a role within the organisation rather than a name, espe-
cially in a multi-shift organisation.
Establishing a policy within the organisation to determine what roles and respon-
sibilities exist in speaking with the media is not only about ensuring the right
message gets across, but is about defining the process for the media when
comment is made. This is particularly so within government departments where
public scrutiny of their practices is highlighted through the media and often as a
result of something negative rather than positive.
Key pointers to dealing with the media are:
• Never lie – the easiest way to be embarrassed is to lie. Do not make an
answer up regarding an issue. If the situation permits, advise the media that
you can seek further clarification on the point they are interested in.
• Be courteous – being polite to the media ensures some level of balance.
Taking an alternative approach may lead to a love-hate relationship that can
be portrayed within the media in preference to the desired message, e.g.
politicians’ relationship with the media.
• Be aware of deadlines – find out the deadlines different media outlets are
working to and do your best to work with them to meet those deadlines.
• Make yourself available to the media – it is important to recognise the level of
power and influence the media have within the community. If you have given
the correct contact details, it may help you clarify an aspect of the information
prior to print or broadcast, and allow for further contact. It is important to
recognise this relationship and to ensure that an appropriate spokesperson is
available.
While all these skills and simple processes can help meet the needs of the media
and can strengthen the relationship, it is important to remember that the media
has no alliances. Their primary need is to sell – newspapers, magazines, advertis-
ing. Their key interest is to get the story out to the public first and in a way that
will give them the best headlines.
Therefore, in risk communication, an element of risk lies in using the communica-
tion medium of ‘the media’.
Media don’t especially want to know the ins and outs of how great
the risk is likely to be, how sure the experts are or how they found
out. If the story is important enough these technical details merit a
follow up, a side bar on the 3rd or 4th day. (Sandman, 1986)
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Case Study – Petrol Tanker Accident
When emergency incidents occur that may give the media an angle for a
story, the way the emergency service concerned manages the information
surrounding the incident can either provide the story or report the incident.
Within the New Zealand Fire Service, a guide has been developed to help
those working with the media to ensure information is factual or to provide
an avenue to put across an educational message.
Following a petrol tanker accident that involved a number of emergency
services, local and regional councils, industry specialists and roading au-
thorities, media interest was strong. Concerns about the environmental im-
pact this incident could have caused raised media interest on a national
scale, with major television news, radio and newspaper representatives present
at the accident site.
A concern of the media was the environmental aspect and the ‘danger’ level
of what emergency services were doing in removing some 36,000 litres of
fuel. There was an opportunity to ensure that the organisation’s role and
success could be portrayed and to mitigate the perception of the danger in
operations and the environment.
The Fire Service Commander did an interview with the news media explain-
ing what operations had been undertaken and the steps currently being
undertaken.
During the interviews, every effort was made to meet the needs of the me-
dia, such as:
• establishing an area to do the interview that provided the television
media a suitable backdrop to support their news story;
• structuring the content of the interview with the media before formal
question time;
• not using organisational jargon;
• speaking in short, structured sentences to allow the media news ‘bites’;
• providing full name and service position; and
• structuring a period that allowed for photos and camera shots of the
scene that supported the media’s interest.
The outcome of this approach ensured:
• the needs of the media were meet;
• the message portrayed within the paper, on radio and on television was
factual;
• concerns raised by the media were mitigated; and
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Making headlines: looking for the fishhooks
The proliferation of media outlets and the competition between the international
conglomerates that own most of them mean the media landscape is very different
to what it was just a few years ago.
In a deregulated open market, the dominant players set the tone, with packaged,
predictable formats directed at audiences segmented and maximised around ad-
vertising. Stories are shorter, punchier, and visual – anything with pictures sells.
Questions and responses are highly edited, and the language used is colourful
and emotive. Conflict, disasters, scandal, controversy – that’s what journalists
look for in a story.
To create a story, participants are often assigned set ‘roles’: victim, villain, hero,
witness, expert. The journalist will want to know what happened: When? Why?
Whose fault was it? What was your role? How much did it cost? What do you feel
about it?
When assessing any given risk communication situation for its news ‘value’, bear
those points in mind and look for ways in which to give the journalist enough to
make a story, while avoiding the sort of headlines every organisation dreads.
To deal effectively with situations where media are likely to be involved, ensure
that key spokespeople are clearly identified and well trained in responding to
media queries.
Always prepare and plan. Do not be caught out by off-the-cuff questions and door
stopping. Use a message map to prepare your key points, prioritising and con-
densing them until you are sure you have a sound bite a journalist will want to
use. Get your main point down to five seconds – about 15 words; it’s all the time
you may have to get out the most important information.
Keep your key messages to the forefront and look for ways to bring any interview
back to them, no matter what is asked.
• Don’t lose your cool, not matter what the provocation.
• Don’t use jargon – you’ll lose your audience and are unlikely to get your
message across.
• Don’t say anything off the record, unless you intend for it to be made public.
• Don’t answer difficult questions that haven’t actually been asked.
• the audience had an answer on what had happened, the risks present,
and who had been involved.
These steps followed organisational policy that is an essential element to
meeting the needs of the media.
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The use of numbers and probabilities
Risk managers love numbers! The concepts behind modern risk management
exist only because of the development of the mathematics of probability 350
years ago, starting with Blaise Pascal, through to Thomas Bayes a century later,
and more recently, Harry Markowitz and his theory of portfolio diversification.
But there are a number of problems associated with using numbers to communi-
cate risk.
Not being able to think with numbers
Firstly, many people do not know how to think with numbers, or to reason about
uncertainty and risk – they are ‘statistically innumerate’, as Gerd Gigerenzer points
out in Reckoning with Risk (2003). He reports on a German study where 1,000
people were asked to choose what ‘40 percent’ means, from (i) one quarter, (ii) 4
out of 10, or (iii) every 40th person.
About a third of those questioned got it wrong. Even among professionals such
as physicians, Gigerenzer found a high level of statistical innumeracy, for example
in dealing with false positives in cancer screening techniques such as mammog-
raphy.
He presented the following information to a group of physicians:
“The probability that a group of asymptomatic women has breast cancer is 0.8%.
If a woman has breast cancer, the probability is 90% that she will have a positive
mammogram. If a woman does not have breast cancer, the probability is 7% that
she will still have a positive mammogram.” Imagine a woman who has a positive
mammogram. What is the probability that she actually has breast cancer?
The answers ranged from 1% to 90%, with the highest number answering 90%.
Only a small number got the correct answer of 9%. But when he presented the
same problem in a different way to a similar group of physicians, most got the
correct answer. This is the alternative way Gigerenzer presented it:
“Eight out of every 1,000 women have breast cancer. Of these 8 women with
breast cancer, 7 will have a positive mammogram. Of the remaining 992 women
who don’t have breast cancer, some 70 will still have a positive mammogram.
Imagine a sample of women who have positive mammograms in screening. How
many of these women actually have breast cancer?”
Why did a much greater number of physicians give a correct answer for the
problem when it was presented in this way? Because even people who are statis-
tically innumerate mostly know how to count!
So the first rule of risk communication in relation to the mathematics of risk is,
where possible, always use frequencies of occurrence rather than probabilities.
Probabilities deal with numbers between 0 and 1, or with percentages, and require
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mathematical formulae to solve the problem. Frequencies are expressed as num-
bers that can simply be added, subtracted, multiplied or divided.
Solving the problem can be made even easier if the frequencies are depicted
visually as a tree with numerical ‘branches’. For each category (starting with 1,000
people) split them into two branches, 8 with cancer and 992 without cancer; the
8 with cancer split into seven who test positive and one who doesn’t, and the
992 without cancer split into 70 who test positive and 922 who don’t).
The particular type of miscommunication outlined above relates to conditional
probabilities, and is very common. Saying “if a woman has breast cancer, there is
a 90% probability that she will test positive on a mammogram” is not the same
as saying “if a woman tests positive, the probability that she has breast cancer is
90%”.
But it is not the only type of miscommunication when using numbers. Another
very common problem involves absolute and relative percentages.
Consider the following, examples of which can be seen in newspapers nearly
every day:
The number of crimes solved by police fell 9% over the last year,
from 43% to 34%.
Did the number of crimes solved fall by 9%?
If we think about the problem in frequencies, we would see that for every 100
crimes committed a year ago, 43 were solved. Currently, for every 100 crimes
committed, 34 are solved. As the number 34 is 21% smaller than the number 43
(9 divided by 43 expressed as a percentage), it would also be true to report that
“The number of crimes solved by police fell 21% over the last year, from 43% to
34%”. Which is correct?
The first way of depicting the story uses absolute percentage reduction, whereas
the second way uses relative percentage reduction. Relative percentages are more
correct mathematically if the sentence is worded as the example above, but
absolute percentages are more easily understood by the average reader (how
many people would write to the editor to point out the ‘error’ if the second
sentence had been used?).
The miscommunication problem is that both methods are used interchangeably,
with the choice often depending on what point the writer is trying to make. As
relative percentages are always larger, they are often used when reporting posi-
tive outcomes, and vice versa.
This potential for miscommunication of this type gets larger as the percentages
get smaller.
Gigerenzer quotes the following example relating to a drug trial:
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Treatment Deaths per thousand
people with condition
Drug 32
Placebo 41
The absolute reduction in deaths is less than 1% (nine people in 1000), but the
relative reduction is 22% (9 divided by 41 expressed as a percentage).
As we saw in relation to the problem of conditional probabilities, if frequencies
are used rather than, or in addition to, percentages (such as the frequencies
expressed in the drug trial data above), the potential for miscommunication is
considerably reduced. The report on the drug trial would then say that “nine
fewer people in every 1,000 people with the condition died when taking the drug”
– simple and unambiguous.
Of course, it is not always possible to quote frequency data concerning risks, as
it is usually only available when historical data has been able to be collected.
Using frequency data where a probability has only been estimated (for example,
based on expert opinion) would give rise to a quite different problem – the
illusion of certainty.
A third very common type of miscommunication through the use of numbers
involves single number probabilities without any reference to what they relate to.
Consider the following statements:
There is a 10% probability of an magnitude 7.6 earthquake in Wellington.
There is a 1% chance of dying in a road accident in New Zealand.
There is an 80% chance that the operation will be successful.
All the above statements are true – but only when qualified with additional
reference information relating to the period over which the percentage is calcu-
lated. When this vital information is added, the probabilities might be communi-
cated as follows:
There is a 10% probability of a magnitude 7.6 earthquake in Wellington within
the next 50 years.
There is a 1% chance of dying in a road accident in New Zealand over a
person’s average lifetime of 75 years.
There is an 80% chance that the operation will be successful in prolonging life
for a further 5 years.
Miscommunication of this type often occurs because people remember only the
percentage figure, and subsequently pass it on without the reference information.
Once again, the miscommunication within the first set of statements above might
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have been avoided if the writer had used a frequency statement first, because they
are more likely to force you to think about the reference information: “One person in
every 100 will die in a road accident over a person’s average lifetime of 75 years”.
Incorrect risk inferences from numbers
Even with the reference information included, miscommunication can occur when
people try to draw from probability numbers a conclusion that cannot be inferred
without additional information.
Take the example above of the deaths from road accidents in New Zealand, which
is based on data from several years ago (500 deaths amongst a population of 3.8
million, and a lifetime averaging 75 years, assuming a similar death rate during
that period).
Data from another country might be 4000 deaths amongst a population of 60
million, i.e., a 0.5% chance of dying in a road accident over a person’s lifetime.
Can we infer from this data that it is twice as dangerous to drive on New Zea-
land’s roads? We may think so – but we have not been given any information on
how many kilometres people typically drive in either country.
If we are now told that people in New Zealand drive twice as far on average each
year compared to the other country, we could infer that it is equally as dangerous
to drive in that country as it is in New Zealand.
Lesson: when we try to infer risk information from data, we must ensure that we
have sufficient data to make the inference a valid one, otherwise we may be
grossly miscommunicating the extent of the risk.
Precision versus accuracy
Numbers often imply a level of accuracy regarding the size of a risk that simply
does not exist. Some risk experts distinguish between ‘uncertainty’ and ‘risk’,
using the latter term only when there are numerical probabilities able to be
assigned to it (they may be either objective, from historical data for example, or
subjective).
This is not a recommended approach, as all risk is fundamentally associated with
uncertainty – after all, if an event is ‘certain’, there would be no risk.
However, we need to guard against using precise numbers to imply a level of
accuracy – ‘certainty about the uncertainty’ – that simply isn’t warranted.
At one level, this is similar to the high school mathematics discipline of rounding
an answer to a particular number of significant figures or decimal places that
reflects the accuracy of the input figures: 2 times 2 does not equal 4.00000000,
even if that is what your calculator says!
Similarly, you should not communicate a ‘1 in 6 chance of occurring’ as ‘a
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16.666667% chance of occurring’, or even as ‘a 16.67% chance’. There is a rea-
sonable likelihood that the ‘1 in 6’ phrase was communicating an approximate
value in the first place, and to redefine it to even two significant figures is creat-
ing an illusion of accuracy about the probability which is completely different – a
‘triumph of precision over accuracy’, as some people say.
The problem is often evident in risk management practice when ‘semi-quantita-
tive’ risk analysis techniques are used. It is fairly common to assign numerical
values to qualitative descriptors of likelihood (such as rare, unlikely, possible,
likely, almost certain, etc.) and/or consequence, in order to perform mathematical
analysis of the risk size (e.g., by multiplying the assigned likelihood value by the
assigned consequence value). Thus, for example, the descriptor ‘rare’ may be
assigned a figure of 1%, ‘unlikely’ may be assigned 5%, etc.
To the uninformed, the use of these figures can imply that they actually mean
something in a real numerical sense, when in fact they are meaningless as real
measures. As AS/NZS 4360 notes, “the value allocated to each description may
not bear an accurate relationship to the actual magnitude of consequences or
likelihood”, and the associated handbook warns “If using a semi-quantitative
approach, it is important not to interpret the results to a finer level of precision
than is actually contained in the initial descriptive rankings. Numbers should not
be used to give an appearance of a level of precision which does not exist”.
Numbers in risk communication are of greatest use in relating relative risks.
Absolute risk values lack context for many people but, if they can use the values
to compare the risk to something they are familiar with, the value conveys mean-
ing such as ‘this is twice as high a risk as that’.
Avoiding miscommunication with numbers – a summary
• Remember that many people are statistically innumerate.
• Use frequency statements whenever possible.
• Be careful not to reverse the order of conditional probabilities.
• Don’t confuse absolute and relative percentages.
• Don’t use single number probabilities without any reference information.
• Be careful of drawing incorrect risk inferences from numbers.
• Don’t use precise numbers to imply a level of accuracy that doesn’t exist.
The tension between simplification and excessive detail
Analysts have their own understanding and perspectives on risk. Often their
understanding of details and interdependencies make it difficult to provide sim-
ple answers. As with all stakeholders, effectively engaging in risk communication
with analysts requires some appreciation of their perspectives.
Everyone has experienced times when we have wanted the answer to a question,
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but what comes back to us is so overwhelming that we are instead presented
with a dilemma: either accept that answer, or ask a further question.
So it is with risk practitioners. In attempting to deliver clarity and concision risk
practitioners may instead bring forth an overwhelming combination of the exten-
sive and the detailed. A tension then arises in thoughts of those whom we brief
on the results of our work: do we live with this awareness of the extent of our
ignorance and get on with our lives, or do we engage it and ask another ques-
tion?
Our clients are busy people. They are not looking for something more to do,
when up pops a report from people ostensibly working for their organisation that
sets out large numbers of actions that someone must expedite. The tension
exists from the moment the client starts wondering: ‘Must we?’ ‘Do we have to?’
‘Isn’t there something simpler?’
The tension between what is wanted and what is offered serves an economic
purpose: keeping analysts in work! So, successfully removing the tension might
be career limiting for those whose job it is.
But this should not be so. Adam Smith said that it was in the best interests of
themselves that the butcher and baker attend to the best interests of their cus-
tomers. And so it should be for providers of risk services. If Adam Smith is right,
then analysts should be able to succeed in meeting the best interests of their
clients by resolving the tension, and letting customers walk out the door. If the
work of the analyst benefits the client, then the client should return.
The key to finishing risk analysis work is to prevent the tension arising in the first
place, by not presenting overwhelming amounts of information that require more
processing and stimulate more questions.
To a psychologist, tension is the disruptive and upsetting condition that occurs
when there is a heightened level of anxiety about the stable continuation of
orderly life. This tension can be resolved if the actions demanded of the executive
as a result of the risk analysis are both few in number and simple to enact. This
means that they must be easy to understand and, most importantly, they must be
obviously and substantially do-able by the resources at the executives’ disposal
as part of the ordinary business of the company.
Even if analysts have carried out sophisticated and subtle analysis, they must
then develop as simple a solution as possible for the treatment of the risk they
have found. The analysis of the problem isn’t the answer. The solution to it is,
and that is where the focus should be.
Analysts who want to deliver must accept that ‘the detail’ is their domain, and
that ‘the simple’ is the client’s. To communicate detail is simply the wrong thing to
do. Clients might be comforted to know that the detail is there, strongly under-
pinning the simplicity, but they do not need to know it.
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Analysts should provide solutions for the treatment of risk, not the workings used
to derive it. With this simple rule, the substantial cause of the tension is gone.
Clients should not need to study in order to understand what they need to do.
Analysts who require this of them, in the misguided view that a client will be
impressed with lots of cogs, springs and balance wheels, is acting contrary to
Adam Smith’s rules governing their own business success.
Even if the focus has been on finding a simple solution to a complex problem –
i.e., a treatment that can be implemented largely with the available resources –
that does not mean the treatment will be actioned. If it is not, the analyst should
not point a finger at the client, nor hide behind management speak – ‘buy in is
needed from the top’, ‘enterprise wide cohesion will be called for’, ‘effective
communication of roles and responsibilities is a pre-requisite’ – as preconditions
for their work being successful. Instead the analyst works out how to get viable
risk treatment actions placed and eventually cleared.
‘Simple solutions carried out’ is the goal of risk analysis and if this is not at-
tained, the funders of risk work would be right to question its value. When
scoping work, it is often preferable for outputs to be specified rather than inputs.
But in risk work, output specifications are themselves inadequate, because their
associated quanta are open-ended.
It is rational to ask for ‘a list of the risks’, but irrational to say ‘…and there must
be only five of them’. Instead, the analyst must think in terms of outcomes, and
eventually influence the client towards thinking of specifying risk work in this
way. Thus: ‘the risk analysis derives a strategy for halving the client’s risk expo-
sure in five years’; or, ‘the risk analysis must calculate an opening date that has
a 95% level of confidence of being met’.
For an analyst to get viable actions accepted by a client, they must first ensure
the specification of their work is outcomes-based – which is what the client wants
– and then show that the actions will deliver the outcomes. As long as the above
advice on simplicity is followed, then there is no logical reason for the actions not
to be accepted.
It is not easy to deliver simple solutions to outcomes-based requirements that
are justified by workings as sophisticated as is necessary, and so some practical
tactics might help.
Risk treatment actions should be targeted according to what the recipients are
empowered to expedite. There is little point in recommending to a project man-
ager that changes in personnel policy need to be made to prevent trainees leav-
ing after two years, just as there would be no point in recommending to an HR
director that a construction site be floodlit in winter.
Risk treatments that require revisions to investment strategy or policy should be
directed to the CEO or the Board of Directors, in a report written specifically for
them:
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A second tier of funding is required to underwrite the potential risk exposure
on construction risk [investment strategy – Board]
Recruitment Policy must permit a +25% increase in salary levels for civil engi-
neers if they are to be retained [policy – Board]
Risk treatments that require changes to the body of company process should be
directed at senior managers.
Work on the delayed new IT centre should be suspended and IT staff involved
redeployed to install life extension modifications to the current centre [proc-
ess – senior managers]
The emergency generators should be brought out of reserve and loaned to the
contractor to power floodlights that would permit night working  [process –
senior managers]
Risk treatments that require changes to the procedures staff follow in their opera-
tion of the company assets should be directed at middle managers.
Goods Inwards need to fast track deliveries to the print room the same day for
three months. Quality Control procedures can be by-passed for this [proce-
dure – middle managers]
The development area needs to be secure and all external reports cleared
before release [procedure – middle managers]
Risk treatments that require changes to established custom and practice on a
specific construction site, an office, a meeting or any other work situation, should
be directed at the immediate management of the individuals concerned.
Staff must not use the fuel bay access as a short cut to the car park [practice
– managers concerned]
All inquiries from the press are to be directed to the Press Office [practice –
managers concerned]
It should be clear from the examples that to communicate these rational actions
to any other recipient would be irrational, would introduce tension, and worse,
probably result in ineffective, or no, treatment.
A well thought out allocation of treatment is, of itself, insufficient because it is
possible that it might be put into practice less than perfectly. The most common
signs of this are that treatment actions are neglected, and that a counter-view
emerges of what they should be.
The wise analyst needs to anticipate reactions such as these and consider not
only what needs to be done, but also how much of it falls onto the shoulders of
the groups and individuals concerned. The amount of effort imposed on them
should not be unreasonable and the argument for expending it, persuasive.
Each group should receive a Risk Treatment Plan (RTP) that has been prepared
specifically for them. This does not mean that each one risk-one person pairing
gets its own RTP, but neither should there be a register of 500 risks with each
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person having to filter out their actions. A well-struck balance is called for, and if
outcomes are the objective of the risk study, that balance should be biased
towards a few specific tasks per group.
Each group has a capacity for treatment work largely dictated by the numbers of
people within it, the limits of its delegated authority, and the time they have
available. It would be wrong to allocate a group a quantum of treatment action
bigger than it could cope with; or that would require it to act outside of its
prescribed domain to expedite; or that it has no time in its work plan to carry out.
The quantum is a difficult call but some reasonable guidelines (not absolutes)
are:
• No more than three actions to each member of the target group.
• For the actions to have a 50% work content in common, i.e. doing one thing
gets the actionee half way through all three.
• For the actions to be 75% a minor variation of their ordinary work.
• For the actions to be capable of substantial completion within two months.
• For those actions to be designed, or phrased, in such a way that the comple-
tion can be declared, i.e. that they are not open ended: e.g. ‘report back on
competitor market share next month’ and not ‘monitor competitor market
share’.
So for a treatment plan directed at a planning department comprising one leader
with two staff in a State Owned Enterprise ‘challenged’ to deliver twice the usual
quantity of deliverables in half the time, the analyst should devise an risk treat-
ment plan along the following lines:
Nine actions of which…
• The team leader is asked to:
– brief the Board to assure them that matters are in hand;
– consult the Press Office to agree the boundaries of public disclosure; and
– prepare and submit budget changes to the Finance Department.
• Staff member one is asked to:
– devise a costed resource plan for the forthcoming additional work load;
– prepare the text of a recruitment advertisement; and
– complete the annual assessments of the existing team to ensure a proper
effort is made to retain their services.
• Staff member number two is asked to:
– specify the IT requirements for a doubling in size of the team;
– specify the office requirements for same; and
– place the necessary purchase orders with the appropriate departments.
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This might be completely at odds with the usual approach to the management of
risk, which is to decide a treatment action for each discrete risk and prioritise
according to the severity of its potential impact and likelihood.
Instead it is recommended that the number of treatment actions should be lim-
ited to what can be done, on the grounds that to recommend what cannot be,
either in terms of quantity, inappropriateness or imprecision, is wasteful. It might
be self-serving in the short term to roll lots of things out and check up on them
now and again. But clients will eventually become aware that the treatments
recommended do not give them the outcomes they want, and this will ultimately
devalue the benefit of having risk analysis done in the first place.
Limiting the number of actions to what can be done should not imply that the
number of risks should also be limited. This should remain the number identified.
But an analyst must distil the number found to match the number of treatment
actions that can be tolerated. This will almost certainly require some thought into
the root causes of the risks and probably a feedback loop from the drafting of the
actions to the description of the risks, producing a map of identified risks to
treatment actions that might possibly see meta-risk descriptions inserted be-
tween the two.
Such care to devise a workable solution may still founder. The usual explanation
given for the failure of risk processes to treat risk successfully is ‘lack of client
support from the top’. This is often disingenuous on the part of the analysts.
Consider the example of nine actions above. No company top tier would reject
them nor fail to support them. What would limit implementation would be a
failure on the part of the analyst to state clearly what is needed by staff to
complete the actions in terms of finance, time and resources. Or if this is urgent
or too difficult for them to arrange, to take it upon themselves to make the
necessary arrangements on their behalf.
Even when this is done, an analyst’s solution for risk treatment might still be
invalid. First, no risk treatment should be recommended if it is contrary to con-
tract, mandated specifications or the applicable law unless this is explicitly stated
with solutions for avoidance (not evasion).
Second, it is invalid to recommend treatment actions for others to carry out if
they have no authority to act. The authority needs to be real and if it is not there,
the analyst needs to draw this to the attention of those able to delegate it, which
may mean widening the circulation of an individually-focused risk treatment re-
port. A simple way to check for a shortfall in authority is to ask before a report is
published if those given actions can carry them out without recourse to others.
All actions will at some stage be the subject of review and the benefits they might
produce should be analysed. Such an analysis should be quantitative if at all
possible. That is, the numbers in it should have dimensions that relate to real life
– cost, weeks, equivalent fatalities, numbers of species, and so on – rather than
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pseudo risk rankings based on one person’s value judgments, with the numbers
of things found depending on research effort.
Analysis should show estimates of the exposure to risk before and after the
treatment plan. If exposure to risk does not behave according to the textbooks –
i.e., it reduces persistently over time, and that it might get worse before it gets
less – then this should be made explicit if only to protect the treatment plan and
those implementing it from questioning.
To resolve the tension between simplification and excessive detail, it is important
to recognise that both have their rightful place in a risk management process. The
detail is a natural consequence of an analyst’s research. A thorough understand-
ing of it is a firm basis for derivation of risk treatment solutions. The simplifica-
tion is achieved by limiting the number of actions and their specification to
something that is within the capability and ability of the recipients to deliver. This
might mean deriving specific plans for specific teams, with a high proportion of
ordinary business in their make up. These treatment plans should not be contrary
to contract nor to delegated authority without commensurate suggestions for
avoidance (not evasion). They should be supported by quantitative assessment
of their costs and benefits.
The tension that lasts is the unresolved one. The tension that never lasts is the
one not introduced in the first place.
The challenges of communicating uncertainty
The certain world is one in which ‘Yes’, ‘100%’, ‘No problem’, ‘It will’ is common-
place and comforting. When we approach the boundaries of this known world
and switch to ‘Maybe’, ‘A good chance’, ‘Shouldn’t be a problem’, ‘It might’, we
feel unsafe. This is surprising, for the domain of ‘the uncertain’ is more wide-
spread, more persistent and more present in everyday life than ‘the certain’, and
we ought to be much more familiar with it than we are.
The problem lies in the mathematics. Most of us are competent at arithmetic
because of the need to count change. This gives us confidence dealing with
certainty because the probabilities that define it can be usefully manipulated
using simple arithmetic: they add up and they multiply. It is easy to do, and the
results can be readily understood because they are useful to us in the everyday
world.
But when we start to talk in terms of uncertainty, arithmetic rapidly transforms
into mathematics and begins to make use of such unsettling terms as combina-
tions, permutations, factorials, samples, populations, inferences etc. One by one
we retire from the struggle to understand as the mathematics plunges out of the
world of certainty, and the general audience logs off mentally the moment (1–P)
appears on the whiteboard.
Let us assume we have to communicate an analysis that has a high degree of
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uncertainty about it, either in the confidence of its conclusions or intrinsic to the
workings of the analysis itself. There are two barriers that must be overcome to
help an audience understand it better.
The first is the most obvious one: understand the audience and their appetite for
the vocabulary, syntax and semantics in which the analysis is to be couched. An
academic audience will readily follow and prefer ‘the joint probability of…’ and
the ‘with an R-squared value of…’, but a non-academic audience will find it much
easier to follow imprecisions like ‘the probability of both happening drops to…’
and ‘…has a good match to…’.
To facilitate this it might be worth the time and money to prepare two, or more,
reports on the same analysis. One couched in precise terms, and the other in
everyday language. It would probably be useful to name them slightly differently
to attract the right readers, for example:
Statistical Analysis and Results of a Risk Assessment into the Costs and
Timescales of a Proposed Programme of National Infrastructure
…or…
National Infrastructure: Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations of an
Investigation
Which title would you reach for?
Other aspects need to be understood too. The audience may or may not be an
homogenous group. If it is not, then working out to what degree the various sub-
groups are invested in the risks and outcomes may be important – but not
necessarily. Such an analysis may be full of insight, but it would then be impos-
sible to communicate without being influenced by it. Nuances will appear and
positions will be taken. All of which may count against eventual acceptance of the
analysis because the audience will perceive them and may react against them. It
is important to be clear, honest and neutral, for although one might defend
oneself to a hostile audience as being ‘only the messenger’, there is no doubt
that warming to the messenger does help carry a message.
Recognise that an audience will be mostly made up of people representing con-
stituencies. Knowing what these constituencies are is valuable because it allows
one to anticipate questions. Recognise that most of these questions are ones the
questioners themselves will be asked.
So take a detached view, think about what Representative A would ask about the
issue, then prepare a Question & Answer list, and work through this at the same
time as working through the communication. And so on through the list of repre-
sentatives, thinking about supplementary questions as well.
The second barrier to overcome when communicating an analysis peppered with
uncertainty is to understand yourself. For most people, this implies exercising
some self control. There can be many reasons for wanting to communicate: we
71
Planning & Delivery
are obliged to do so, we believe we must, we like an audience, we want to
impress, we want to contribute to the debate. But the one that must prevail when
the time comes to communicate the results of an analysis is that we believe it is
in our audiences’ best interests to know, and that they will act.
Informal and Formal Communications Channels
Official channels for communications
From an analyst’s perspective there is really only one official channel of commu-
nication, and that must be to the client. The client has paid for the analysis and
for the treatment solution, and it would a breach of professional standards, and
probably the contract as well, to communicate anything arising from or about
their commission to anyone else but them. It is then for the client to decide who
is briefed, and when, on what the analysis has found.
There will, however, be occasions when an analyst feels their integrity is being
compromised. There are three sets of circumstances in which this might be the
case. They are when the client, who is normally a paid servant of the owners of
the legal entity that has hired the analyst, might act:
• contrary to the owners’ interests;
• in breach of the law; and/or
• in a manner prejudicial to society.
The following guidance may help.
In the first case, where the owners’ interests are threatened, an analyst must first
complete the work to the best of their ability. Second, they must ensure their
records are complete with all errors and omissions noted. Third, a copy of these
records should be deposited with a third party for safe-keeping, and fourth, they
should hold a minuted meeting with their client to explain their concerns.
If the meeting cannot resolve the matter satisfactorily, the analyst should request
a repeat meeting in the presence of a non-executive director. If this is not forth-
coming then the analyst should ask his or her own employers to approach a non-
executive director with this request. A non-executive director cannot be a share-
holder of the company and must be trusted by the analyst to act with independ-
ence in the interests of the shareholders. Once the non-executive director has had
the issue explained comprehensively, the analyst has fulfilled their duty and should
make no other petition. The matter is now for the Board to decide.
A minor matter (but of great importance to the analyst) is that they should ask
the non-executive director to secure payment of their fees by overruling any
blocks or delays that might be put on their payment as a consequence of the
analyst’s actions.
In the second case, in which a breach of the law is thought likely, the analyst
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must carry out the same first three steps as above, remembering that what is
being archived may be subpoenaed as evidence before a court of law. This re-
quires diligence and honesty: nothing should be omitted from the record. The
analyst is generally an employee of a legal entity and as such acts in the name of
that entity, and so must brief his or her own managers. It is then for the employer,
not the analyst, to take legal advice on what to do next and to act accordingly.
In the third case, in which actions prejudicial to society are the issue of concern
(possibly without a clear, potential breach of the law or of the owners’ interests),
then the analyst should seek the advice of their professional institution, which
will advise independently in the analyst’s best interests and may even take up
the matter.
Under no circumstances talk to the media or to politicians. Control will be lost
and the matter made public with positions entrenched. Putting the truth on the
record – of the analysis, of what was done, of its shortcomings, of its findings –
is the main duty of an analyst, and it is one that is always best done away from
the glare of the spotlight.
Staff are also members of the community
The IAG case study illustrates how one organisation actively sought to work with
the community to communicate on risks and collaboratively find solutions. When
undertaking risk communication with the public, it is important that organisa-
tions recognise their role as part of the community.
Case Study – Flood Risk Management: An Insurer’s Perspective
Storms and floods are becoming an increasingly regular occurrence in New
Zealand. As a consequence, insurance claims from weather disasters are
climbing dramatically.
For IAG NZ, New Zealand’s largest insurer trading under the State and NZI
brands, weather has become a vital concern. Weather related disasters repre-
sent 19 of the top 20 insurance losses in New Zealand with flooding by far
the most significant cause of damage, responsible for 70% of all weather-
related losses (Insurance Council New Zealand).
In recent years, several ‘one-in-100’ year flooding events have occurred.  Thames
Coromandel, central New Zealand, Gisborne and the Bay of Plenty have all
been affected resulting in the disruption of lives and insurance costs amounting
to hundreds of millions.
Weather and climate are ‘core business’ for the insurance industry. Insurers
underwrite weather-related catastrophes by calculating, pricing and spread-
ing the risk and then meeting claims when they arise. Unlike many overseas
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countries, in New Zealand flooding is a standard peril covered by property
and home insurance. But the challenge the insurance industry face here,
given any increase in the frequency and severity of events, is how to ensure
flood cover remains sustainable and affordable.
Following severe weather events insurance plays a vital role in helping the
community get back on its feet. The 2002 ‘weather bomb’ and 2004 central
New Zealand storms and flood events highlighted the need for IAG NZ to
have a coordinated approach to managing natural disaster events. A formal
Disaster Response framework followed. This framework outlines steps from
declaring a disaster and convening key decision makers, to the approach in
the field and key messages to customers and the media.
As IAG NZ’s claims call centre staff deal with the sharp rise in claims call
volumes, a nationwide team of loss adjustors are mobilised to assist on the
ground. Their brief includes liaising with local emergency and rescue serv-
ices, civil defence and local authorities on insurance recovery plans and to
assist the clean-up and re-building stages. Public safety messages and ‘what
to do’ tips are communicated via the media to assist and reassure customers
even before loss adjustors can reach them.
Typically after natural disasters individual groups or organisations are blamed
for the problem – local or central governments, town planners, developers,
insurers, engineers and the like. But natural disasters are a community-wide
issue and management of them and effective recovery from them can only be
achieved effectively by community-wide solutions.
But community partnership can also extend beyond immediate relief. In the
wake of the ‘weather bomb’ that devastated part of the Coromandel Penin-
sula in 2002, IAG NZ joined with territorial authorities to address the signifi-
cant issue of river flooding on the Thames Coast.
Thames Coromandel Coast flood case study
The Coromandel Peninsula is known for its stunning environment of rugged
ranges and beautiful beaches.  It is this environment, characterised by steep,
short catchments, hundreds of streams and rivers and high and frequently
intense rainfall that also makes the district very vulnerable to the natural
hazard of flooding.
In June 2002 a weather bomb hit the Coromandel. The event produced un-
precedented rainfall causing trickling streams to become raging torrents in
just minutes, carrying fallen trees, boulders and thousands of tonnes of mud
through homes, properties and roads.
The weather bomb caused one fatality – a woman was swept out to sea.
Homes were shifted by the force of floodwaters and landslides, others were
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submerged in mud along with cars, leaving many homeless, their lives turned
upside down. Insuring this single event cost IAG NZ more than $12 million,
but its impact on the community was far greater.
Directly after the event IAG NZ’s chief executive at the time, David Smith,
travelled to Thames and met customers and the mayor of the Thames
Coromandel District Council. Seeing the extent of the issues faced by custom-
ers and the community, IAG NZ committed to returning once the immediate
recovery issues had been dealt with. Subsequently, IAG NZ joined the Penin-
sula Project, led by Environment Waikato and the Thames Coromandel Dis-
trict Council. The aim of this group was to address river and catchment
management issues on the Coromandel Peninsula. The work of the Peninsula
Project is ongoing.
Most houses and buildings along the Thames Coast have been built on
alluvial deltas and often lie in the path of floodwaters.  With a long history of
flooding (more than 10 events in the past 20 years) many insurers were
refusing to insure residents for flood-related damage to their properties,
believing it too difficult to secure returns.
An IAG NZ representative attended public and community working party meet-
ings with residents and council staff. The entire IAG NZ executive team also
visited the area and met flood-affected customers and council leaders. IAG
NZ heard first-hand accounts of the impact of the disaster, learned how
streams behave under flood and were told of the issues that were exacerbat-
ing the flooding such as erosion, roading and bridge construction, historic
planning and building controls, sediment and debris build up. These meet-
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ings also graphically reinforced the vital role insurance plays – providing
advice and financial settlements to assist the community to recover.
IAG NZ also collaborated with the councils on flood and climate modelling
research specific to the Coromandel. For several years IAG, the Australian
parent, has engaged world-leading researchers to investigate extreme weather
risk and how these may change in a future climate. This modelling means the
parties have a better understanding of flood estimations for the area. These
estimations were used by Environment Waikato in developing and assuring
that the civil engineering solutions planned would safeguard the communi-
ty’s property and people not just in today’s climate, but also tomorrow’s.
IAG NZ has reviewed their underwriting process for the coast as a result of
the knowledge gained. Flood hazard maps have become an important tool in
this process. The maps predict the areas – to a street number level under a
one-in-100 year flood scenario – that are most likely to be flooded and to
what extent. The maps even detail the depth and speed of flood waters. All
applications for home and contents insurance in the Thames Coast area are
now dealt with individually by specialist underwriters, a departure from the
previous ‘one size fits all’ approach of many insurers, which had seen blanket
withdrawal of flood cover in the past.
The project has committed to flood mitigation plans in the form of stream
channel maintenance, pest control, bridge redesign, engineering works and
property retirements. IAG NZ is now maintaining a watching brief of the
project. Once the risk to property from flood has been reduced, the company
expects to be able to further increase availability of affordable flood cover in
the area.
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Risk communication is often thought of as a one-way process: an organisation
communicating with an external audience about a perceived risk. But as one of
the risk communication rules of thumb is to communicate before rather than after
a crisis, one audience needs particular attention – staff.
Staff in an organisation have a double communication need. They need informa-
tion in order to do their jobs, whether that is assisting members of the public or
ensuring that the organisation is able to keep functioning during risk mitigation
or a period of crisis.
Boundaries between an organisation and the community in which it operates are
permeable. Staff may be in a situation where they or their families are also
personally at risk in some way – so they are both purveyors of and consumers of
the risk communications the organisation is involved in. Having ‘close hold’ ap-
proach to communications in such situations just won’t work.
The best ways in which to enable staff both to function efficiently in their jobs
and to fulfil their responsibilities to their families is to establish clear procedures
and to ensure a two-way flow of information within the organisation – well before
any risk event take place.
Staff who understand their role in a crisis situation or when managing a risk, and
who appreciate its importance, have a better chance of dealing effectively with a
crisis situation. Having established and well-practised procedures, with clearly
understood lines of management and communication, will enable staff to become
risk resilient and to operate efficiently. They need accurate information from sources
they trust – usually an immediate manager – as soon as possible, in any situation
where they and members of the public may be at risk.
Steve Ruru, Chief Executive Officer of the Thames Coromandel District Coun-
cil, assesses IAG NZ’s involvement:
We really welcome the approach from IAG NZ.  It’s what we
want to see in terms of insurance companies being prepared to
sit down and look at the risks in a considered way and getting
to understand the issues that are affecting our community, be-
cause it is vital for the future well-being of these communities
that they can access appropriate insurance cover.  We appreci-
ate that the community needs to front up and reduce those
risks and we are getting a good deal of acceptance. It’s cer-
tainly helping that IAG NZ says if you do these works that will
help make it a lot easier for us to continue to provide appropri-
ate insurance covers. We are just very appreciative of the work
and the relationship we’ve developed with IAG NZ.
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An example where this sort of communication went tragically wrong was the 1947
Ballantynes’ Fire in Christchurch. Forty-one people died in the fire, many of them
staff, and a key issue identified by a Royal Commission into the blaze was the
response of staff to the emergency situation. Many of them stayed working long
after smoke was evident throughout the building. There was no evacuation pro-
cedure in place and staff lacked awareness of the dangers they and their custom-
ers faced:
… employees, with several notable exceptions, had quite failed to
appreciate their danger. He cited cases of some who had seen smoke,
had become aware that there was fire, and had calmly continued to
their comfortable afternoon tea venue before returning to their re-
spective departments; and of others who, being warned to leave
the premises by their respective foremen or forewomen had failed
to do so for a considerable time, and in some cases had returned to
their quarters to recover possessions rendered trivial by the devel-
oping circumstances. Some of the victims had been seen to be
standing at windows, seemingly unaware of the horror that was
even then besieging them.
(Walker, 1983)
Without evacuation drill, without warning-devices, without advice
to employees on the steps to be taken in the event of fire, without
an automatic connection with the fire brigade, and with employees
- many of them young women - numbering some 458, orderly move-
ment, even communication between various departments, can hardly
have been expected, and contradictory instructions - some to stay,
some to evacuate - took the place of efficient order and movement.
59. There is evidence that one of the staff, in a position of some
authority, advised female employees to report back to their depart-
ments on the upper floors. Such advice was given, it is said, at a
time when the smoke from the fire was spreading through the whole
building.
60. There is evidence that some of the employees were so ignorant
of the layout of the premises that they were unaware of alternative
methods of exit from one department to another.
61. It is quite understandable that, when the fire was first discov-
ered, the information passed casually to members of the staff in
various parts of the building remote from the cellar that there was a
fire in one of the cellars would not be unduly disturbing, and per-
haps the nature of the news that leaked through would induce
employees, and indeed the managers, to think that fire in one of the
cellars would not be serious.
(Royal Commission, 1948)
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The risk presented by the initial discovery of smoke was not recognised by staff
untrained in even the basics of fire safety. Communication was faulty, procedures
non-existent, and staff and customers alike suffered.
As a result of the Royal Commission’s findings, fire safety consciousness was
raised at a national level and fire safety procedures became mandatory. Safety
and evacuation drills are now an accepted part of working life, with key staff
trained to deal with emergencies that may arise.
The challenge for most organisations is to ensure the sort of risk recognition,
information sharing and effective procedures that is now an accepted part of
regular fire drills is normalised into other areas of the organisation’s activities.
Managers must be fully receptive to and prepared to act on information from
employees.  All involved must know where they can share risk-related informa-
tion, know what to do if they run into problems, and which emergency or urgency
measures are permitted or required. Clear and simple internal rules are needed to
govern the channels of information, the type of information (data format and type
of content) and by-pass solutions. Only when the staff member passing on the
information is convinced that the authorities in charge will now handle the risk
correctly and will not lose sight of it in the future, will these channels prove
dependable, trustworthy and efficient.
In return, managers must ensure that staff are the first to be fully informed about
any risk situation. The same key guidelines that are used in dealing with an
external audience should also be used for an organisation’s internal audience:
1  Plan and evaluate
• Establish clear objectives. Do you want to stimulate a response? Or help to
resolve an issue?
• What do you know about the risk?
• What do you know about the audience? Work out the different interests in-
volved. Staff will have their own concerns, as well as needing information to
enable them to carry out their roles with an external audience.
2  Listen, understand and empathise
• Find out what your staff think and reflect back to ensure you’ve understood it
correctly. Use a range of feedback mechanisms – through union representa-
tives, via managers or, if technology allows, through electronic means such as
a feedback e-mail address on the intranet that allows issues to be aired and
responses given anonymously.
• Note specific concerns.
• Work out if you’re dealing with outrage and lack of understanding about the
hazard, or outrage and understanding – this affects how you approach the
communication. Is the hazard/risk seen as voluntary or involuntary? Can staff,
through their actions, influence the outcome of the situation in some way?
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3  Be open and honest
• Show respect.
• Admit mistakes.
• Disclose honestly.
• Share information.
• Build trust.
• Be consistent – the same messages should be coming from all managers: from
the chief executive through to line managers and team leaders. Staff will be
very quick to pick up any disconnect in messaging between different layers of
the organisation.
These are all basic tenets of good management, made vital by any situation in
which risks are faced.
4  Co-ordinate and collaborate
• Offer to work with critics. If feedback shows either a lack of understanding or
active antagonism on the part of some staff, ensure those groups are fully
supplied with information and work closely with them to ensure they ‘come on
board’.
• Work with others with similar interests. Do other organisations face similar
risks or have they done so in the past?  Build relationships with them, ensur-
ing staff have a chance to interact with and learn from their counterparts
elsewhere.
• Use credible third parties – this may mean bringing in outside experts to talk
with staff, or it could mean working with a third party such as a union to
ensure they are aware of the risks facing staff and are prepared to do what
they can to help.
5  Keep it simple
• Use concrete examples, not jargon when discussing risk issues with staff.
• Only promise what you can do – this goes to heart of credibility issues.
• Offer solutions – and encourage responses, incorporating good ideas from
staff into the solutions where possible.
• Explain actions and be accountable.
Addressing the rumour mill
Nature abhors a vacuum – and the absence of hard facts in a crisis situation is
bound to ensure an abundance of ‘factoids’ and rumours.
The best way to reduce the likelihood of an active rumour mill operating within
an organisation and when dealing with the general public is to follow the key
guidelines set out in the previous section.
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The importance of two-way communication – listening to the environment, as well
as putting out messages – is paramount in situations where rumours may be rife.
Think of it as dealing with some sort of infection:
• monitor the environment to find the source quickly;
• take speedy corrective action;
• inoculate with the truth or practice some form of containment; and
• keep monitoring to catch any further outbreaks.
Listen to what the rumours are telling you – they may be pointing to a breakdown
in communication channels, both internally and externally. If people are not get-
ting accurate information, they will find ways of manufacturing information to suit
their needs.
The sort of rumours being picked up can tell a lot about people’s fears and
misunderstandings and can point to ways in which communication can be im-
proved.
For instance, disaffected staff may have their own agenda when it comes to the
messages they put out – both to other staff and to external stakeholders. Identi-
fying those involved and getting them on-side will be an important function of
any managers involved in dealing with risks.
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Feedback – What did you Say? versus What did they Hear?
One of the difficulties with communication is that messages are open to interpre-
tation. Each person’s experience and interests are different and this affects the
way they interpret any information that they receive. For this reason, feedback is
an extremely valuable component of the communication process.
In a face-to-face conversation the person speaking is constantly receiving feed-
back through facial expression, gestures such as nodding, verbal confirmation,
tonal inflection and body language. The initiator can gauge whether the listener
is understanding by the constant feedback they receive.
As the scale of audience increases and/or the communicators become more re-
mote the ease of obtaining feedback decreases. In some cases this can mean that
communication becomes entirely one-way and simply turns into information dis-
semination. When this occurs the opportunity for increased levels of misunder-
standing, distrust, outrage and frustration increases and can damage the ability
to engage in further communication on the current and on future risk issues.
Risk perception versus objective risk assessment
Perception is the process of endowing sensation with meaning...
We assimilate our own direct experiences, but these are usually
quite sparse and we have to rely mainly on reports from others and
particularly from television, newspapers and other media. (Lee, 1981)
One outcome of a disconnect between risk perception and risk assessment can
be unwarranted concern over a given risk. A prime example of this occurred in
May 2006 over tsunami warnings in the Bay of Plenty.
The main players in this case were: international media, residents, and the Minis-
try of Civil Defence and Emergency Management.
At 3:42am on May 4, the Pacific Tsunami Warning Centre (PTWC) issued an alert
regarding an offshore earthquake near Tonga. Six minutes later the New Zealand
National contacted the PTWC and was informed that a tsunami was unlikely. At
this point, just like many previous tsunami alerts, the National Crisis Management
Centre (NCMC) was activated to monitor the situation and wait until the tsunami
risk was better known.
However, the international media had picked up on the initial alert and at 4am
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the Mayor of Gisborne was alerted that a tsunami was heading there by CNN.
Various other international media organisations also contacted individuals. Inter-
national news coverage led to many residents being contacted by friends and
family from overseas. By 5am, people were self-evacuating and subsequently
considerable criticism was directed at the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency
Management for not informing people of the impending tsunami until after it was
confirmed as a non-event. The New Zealand Herald reported:
Civil Defence national controller Mike O’Leary defended procedures
yesterday, saying headquarters received word that a tsunami was
[determined to be] unlikely within 15 minutes of receiving the first
Pacific Tsunami Warning Centre report at 3.45am.
For that reason the information was not passed on to the media or
any Government agencies.
Mr O’Leary said staff were not aware until 6am that people had
begun evacuating. Once aware, they prepared a press statement.
The experts in the field of earthquakes, tsunamis and emergency management
understood what was likely to occur and recognised the risk as minimal and
unworthy of alarming the public. The media, on the other hand, took the message
at face-value and, based on their previous knowledge and experience – probably
strongly influenced by the December 2004 Indonesian Tsunami – made a different
assessment.
Our messages are designed for scientists and emergency managers
but in the modern world, everything we do gets out into the public
immediately.
(Freyer,  2006 )
The result of the event was outrage by the public and local bodies for not being
kept better informed by the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Manage-
ment. The Ministry in turn was frustrated for being targeted because of media
reporting that was based on a technically uninformed and incomplete assess-
ment of information that was not intended for that audience to make judgements
upon. The information was misinterpreted and a lack of feedback exacerbated the
situation.
So how can this type of situation be avoided? Sometimes it can’t, but various
measures can be taken to try to minimise the occurrence and impact – primarily
through increasing the accessibility of providing and receiving feedback. Recog-
nising that modern communication systems tap into a larger and more integrated
network than ever before is essential. Examples such as the media and the internet
can and do function independently and instantaneously. This further increases
the need to establish feedback loops that provide for rapid verification of accu-
rate interpretations and an early alert to messages that require clarification and
or refinement.
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The use of participatory evaluation
Participatory evaluation is when all the parties involved in both sending and
receiving communications assess whether the communication is appropriate to
their needs and is proving effective. Evaluation of public participation can be
viewed as a way for organisations to mark progress towards goals related to
governance such as institutional trust (Chess, 2000). This might typically be car-
ried out by surveys or interviews. Components that can be evaluated include
acceptance, satisfaction and adaptation.
Voluntary acceptance is when participants choose to accept a situation rather
than change it. This might be accepting a suggested path such as that a school is
going to close or accepting that they are exposed to a risk such as living on a
flood plain without attempting to mitigate the risk. Evaluating participation re-
quires feedback to determine the level of activity and preferred actions on the
part of the participants. In this way the level of involvement by the participants
can be tracked.
Acceptance can be shown through inaction (no desire to change behaviour), or
conformity (no desire to change level of accountability) and the level of protest.
The level of acceptance provides insight into the willingness of the public to
become actively involved in communicating on a risk or risk strategy. Often, the
potential allocation of blame if the risk is realised will influence the level of
acceptance. For example, prior to occupational health and safety legislation risk
taking in the workplace was accepted as personal responsibility. Under Occupa-
tional Safety & Health there is greater accountability and so acceptance of workplace
risk taking is much reduced.
Satisfaction more than any other evaluation marker is influenced by past per-
formance of the organisations involved. Levels of satisfaction can be assessed to
determine what activities the organisation undertook that made the participants
feel appropriately consulted and what communications efforts detracted from this
goal. This is not limited to public consultations, although these are probably the
most well-known through activities such as service provision assessments. Inter-
nal satisfaction is often evaluated through staff interviews and retention rates.
Formative evaluation is used to assess adaptation. This is done in order to pro-
vide feedback during the development and implementation phases of a risk project.
It enables adaptation of the consultative process to meet the needs of the partici-
pants as the risk management implementation progresses. This may result in
refinement of the language used in questionnaires or altering the balance be-
tween written, verbal and online communication techniques to better suit the
requirements of the participants. Examples of this might include developing mul-
tilingual formats or changing the frequency and length of the communication.
All of the indicators obtained from these evaluations (acceptance, satisfaction
and adaptation) are ways of gauging the level of complacency, previous good
governance, effectiveness of attempts to influence behaviour, or the level of un-
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derstanding of the participants’ role in managing the risk. The purpose in doing
this is provide input for improving risk communication in the future and custom-
ising it to better accommodate the needs of the participants within the overall
risk strategy.
Prior to May 4 2006, there was widespread acceptance of the assumption by the
public and the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (MCDEM)
that it would inform people of imminent tsunami risks as they arose. Immediately
following the morning of May 4 the level of public satisfaction that the MCDEM
was providing appropriate notification and was accessible to advise on imminent
threats decreased markedly. Informal feedback indicated the sudden change via
news media reporting, letters to the editor, talkback radio and statements by
local officials. The response of the MCDEM was to re-evaluate its procedures in
light of the actions on the part of the international media and the informal feed-
back.
Since that time both the Pacific Tsunami Warning Centre and the MCDEM have
undertaken to communicate better with the media. The Centre has undertaken to
make the language of its warnings more suitable for lay interpretation (as a result
of feedback) and the ministry is now issuing statements to advise when there is
no tsunami risk following earthquakes as well as when there is a risk in order to
clarify any information that might be received through other sources. The MCDEM
is also working to increase its accessibility and responsiveness to enquiries.
Understanding all the risks
Another outcome of the lack of feedback in risk communication may be that the
true value of the risk is not appreciated by the different participants. In this type
of scenario the initiator may be trying to encourage the other participants to
adopt certain behavioural changes because of a risk that the initiator is con-
cerned about. In many cases, this is a risk that has been quantitatively assessed
(the severity and probability of occurrence is known) and the other participants in
the communication are exposed to it.
The degree to which feedback is incorporated into evolving the risk strategy can
vary. The use of evaluative results (finding out the risk or risks that the other
participants are concerned about) can make the desired behavioural changes
untenable, particularly if there is a direct conflict. Perceptions of decision-makers,
pressures from outside the organisation and social norms can all influence the
acceptance of incorporating evaluative results (Chess, 2000) in developing and
implementing a risk strategy.
An example is Auckland’s soil contamination problems that have been ongoing
since 2002.
In 2001, the Auckland Regional Council and Auckland District Health Board under-
took an investigation into the potential effect past horticultural activity might
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have on what is now residential land (Gaw, 2002). The resultant report indicated
that toxin levels in the soil of domestic premises built on previously horticultural
land could exceed safe levels and recommended that territorial local authorities
should consider requiring site assessments involving contaminant analysis prior
to allowing a change in land use, subdivision or redevelopment on green field
sites based on the risk to human health and/or ecological receptors (Gaw, 2002).
At this point concerns were raised in the media that soil contained ‘toxic levels of
contaminants’ and were a health risk (as opposed to elevated levels of toxic
contaminants). A subsequent report in 2004 used aerial photographs to identify
areas that, now residential, had previously been horticultural.
As a result of the two reports, Auckland City Council declared that it would in-
clude notices on Land Information Memoranda (LIMs) of up to 5,000 properties
indicating that the land was, to the best of the council’s knowledge, previously
used for horticultural purposes, referring to the soil reports. In order for property
owners that were affected to get this notice lifted they would have to, at their
expense, have soil samples from there properties tested and cleared.
The Crown  Law Office later provided advice to the Ministry for the Environment
that “...the test of a real and substantial risk of contamination is not met. Thus,
such information... is not a mandatory inclusion in a LIM.”
Several key issues were raised by different parties throughout this four-year pe-
riod of soil studies and resultant actions. The appreciation of risks associated
with the studies were different for different stakeholders as were the risk mitiga-
tion actions of the Auckland City Council.
The main issues that arose were:
• Impact on property values (responsibility to inform future residents of risks
posed by toxins versus risk of reduced returns on property sales and financial
impact of proving that a given property does not have high toxin levels).
• Impact on residents’ health from residues (potential risk from exposure versus
experiences of risk realisation by long term residents).
• Interpretation of results (different threshold levels were listed by different
experts).
• Confusion regarding the usage of the terms ‘toxin’ and ‘contaminant’.
• Impact on children (risk to children’s health from playing outside in these
areas versus relative risk to children from all hazards associated with playing
outdoors).
• Impact on home gardens (risk to health from handling soil and eating produce
versus financial impact of buying vegetables).
If greater participatory evaluation had been included in shaping the council’s
assessment and management of the risk, a better understanding of the implica-
tions and appropriateness of potential risk strategies would have been achieved
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prior to implementation. This would have avoided a lot of frustration by all par-
ties.
Feedback as a means of overcoming divergent interpretations
It is often said that we are living in an information age. Information dissemination
is used extensively as a way of educating, informing and consulting but it doesn’t
necessarily lead to understanding. Rather than simply providing information for
open interpretation the use of feedback is essential in establishing an appropri-
ate interpretation and in better understanding the risks involved. Using an iso-
lated perspective to judge the severity of the risk sets the stage for an dispropor-
tionate response – either over or under reaction.
The Gaw report (Gaw, 2002) from the Auckland soil scenario identified high levels
of contaminants in the soil but the response by the council was disproportionate
to the actual health risk posed by the contaminants. Reporting in the media was
also based on misinterpretations of the findings.
Although the soil contaminants that were isolated are toxic and were elevated
compared to what might be expected (ambient thresholds) they were not so
elevated that they posed a significant health risk, especially given the context of
Auckland’s high level of volcanism. Threshold levels for health, ecological, post-
clean-up, ambient and leachate contamination of soils vary. The council did not
necessarily have the background knowledge on toxicology to appreciate this.
The follow-on study to the Gaw report was used to identify land that had been
used for horticulture but did not involve soil sampling. The council’s subsequent
action was to place a notice on LIMs of those properties that had been identified
in the second study. This response further polarised the council’s interpretation of
the findings; assuming that the levels found were dangerous and then assuming
that all land that had previously been used for horticulture would have similar
levels of contamination. Now residents were upset.
Residents were upset because the linkages between their properties and toxins in
the soil were not clear and their properties were now marked as potentially
contaminated without specific site testing to prove it. Instead, the onus was on
the property owners to obtain testing to prove that the properties were not
contaminated.
The reasoning for the council’s action was based on its risk assessment of the
report findings: identifying an unacceptable risk to human health and a risk to
the council in the form of potential litigation for not making the risk known –
logical, based on its interpretation.
The media, primarily the Auckland daily the New Zealand Herald, extrapolated the
finding of toxins to potential impacts on gardeners, children and other partici-
pants in outdoor activities, in some cases confusing the scientific meaning of the
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Case Study – Avalanche Risk Management: the Milford Road
The potential for a large-scale avalanche disaster on the Milford Road is well
recognised. Various world authorities having commented on the severity of
the problem. The risk is estimated as more than an order of magnitude more
dangerous than normal highway travel – approaching the risk faced by heli-
copter operations in New Zealand. Analysis has concluded that avalanche
problems on the Milford Road are as severe as on any other mountain high-
way in the world. An encounter with an avalanche on the Milford Road will
generally not be survivable.
Most travellers do not appreciate the magnitude of the hazard to which they are
exposed. In fact many travellers do not recognise that any hazard exists as
avalanches are not within their domain of experience. There remains ongoing
concern about the potential for a mass fatality on the Milford Road, especially in
view of the rising avalanche hazard attributable to increased volumes of tourist
traffic.
As part of an avalanche programme road closures are instigated when the
avalanche danger is perceived as rising to critical (high) levels or when the
weather is predicted to deteriorate with a probable increase in the avalanche
danger. Road closures eliminate the chance of exposing the travelling public to
the avalanche phenomena, and the risk of a fatality becomes zero.
Most winters there has been at least one near miss avalanche incident, typi-
cally involving, but not limited to, road maintenance contractor’s operational
staff. However, increased exposure of people in winter to Milford’s avalanche
terrain during the past decade serves to counteract some of the risk-lessen-
ing benefits brought about by the Milford Road avalanche programme.
The most appropriate response to the rising avalanche hazard is to openly
communicate the risk to stakeholders. Transit New Zealand recognises the
problems posed by the Milford Road. Their response to the risk has been to
ensure that the road contractor and consultant’s responsibilities are clearly
specified and to promote awareness in the travelling public. The contractor
has well-documented routine procedures for roading operations, weather
monitoring, road closures and active avalanche control using explosives.
Additionally a website devoted to the hazards of the Milford Road is main-
tained by Transit; www.milfordroad.co.nz explains the hazards and carries in-
formation on the current avalanche risks to travellers and guidance on appro-
priate action to take. The Department of Conservation and Transit New Zealand
contractors have supported this initiative. A Travel Tips for Travellers brochure
also relays this information. The major tourism sites stock these brochures and
the Tourism Planning Toolkit put out by Tourism New Zealand also references
the website and the brochures for tourism operators under good practice.
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word contamination used in the reports with the layperson usage which is an
abbreviation of ‘toxic contamination’. It conjured up images of disasters such as
Minemata and Bhopal.
The consequence of the council’s action and news media coverage at the time
was fear within the public:
• Property owners were fearful of financial impacts from reduced property val-
ues (or the expense of independent soil sampling).
• Residents were fearful of the health impacts of living in the identified homes.
• The public of Auckland was fearful of exposure to toxins through gardening
and outdoor activities.
Once the extent of the public reaction became evident the council and others
decided to re-examine the findings, bringing in independent experts for advice.
The background of these people was such that they made an entirely different
interpretation of the initial findings and the council then set about revising its
response to one that was more proportionate with the risks. This included devel-
opment of site investigation and soil sampling protocols for residential sites and
soil sampling of council-owned land.
Hindsight provides the opportunity to learn from past experiences. In this case
there were three opportunities where feedback could have assisted in more ap-
propriate risk mitigation and response:
• Feedback from the council to the researchers and independent experts as to
what they thought the results meant would have assisted in more appropri-
ately shaping the actions of the council.
• Similarly if the media had initially sought greater feedback from scientists on
the meaning of the terminology used in the reports they would have been
better placed to understand the risks that were posed.
• The council could have sought greater feedback from the communities with
regards to the impact of their actions and the risks that were raised by placing
notices on the LIMs.
Levels of Action and Transience of the Learning
Monitoring risk awareness
The need to assess risk awareness exists at two levels, the first at the organisa-
tional level and the second at the level of specific organisational activities.
Risk sensing as a vital element of strategic organisational management has an
internal and external component. Generally, organisations will have strategic plans
against which to measure the significance of changes in the surrounding risk
environment. A strategic plan is intended to dynamically position an organisation
into its operating environment. It is designed to guide decisions and set direc-
tions that are always at risk due to external (for example monetary policy or
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compliance regimes) and internal (for example skill base or disassociation of
component parts) changes.
Risk management can never be successful in a reactive mode, as the organisation
may not be able to manage the risk impact in time. Risk management must be
dynamic and continual. When risk is not spotted in time it is generally because it
was not anticipated.
It is important to ensure that the capacity and competency exists to undertake
strategic risk assessment and communications. This is a prime responsibility
throughout management and governance ranks, and needs to be clearly embed-
ded, with clear accountabilities, in the management culture.
At the organisational level strategic risk can arise from such sources as:
• the nature, quality and continuity of information inputs to any course of ac-
tion (again skill base is important here, as is technology);
• the quality and continuity of the relationship amongst the organisation’s com-
ponents that are assigned to an activity, and between the organisation and its
clients or partners; and
• the appropriateness and robustness of the services and/or products being
offered, and whether these are aligned with the organisation’s vision and
purpose.
It is critical that management and governance maintain oversight of (monitor) the
capacity of the organisation to be ‘risk aware’ and to ensure that surveillance
information, assessments and recommendations for actions are standard agenda
items in management and governance meetings. The flow of information through
the organisation is a critical management concern here as information needs are
ever increasing, operating situations are complex, and time frames for decision
and action can be very short.
At the second level of evaluating risk awareness arising from the organisation’s
actions these elements are essential:
• clear objective setting for the risk communications activity, with measurable
targets as possible;
• clear identification of audiences and strategies for how to approach them;
• commitment to continual surveillance of audience uptake with predetermined
time frames or trigger points for initiating monitoring; and
• management expectation and the process by which monitoring results are
used to advance risk management.
Monitoring is a systematic approach to the collection of data and information and
there are a number of standard strategies available, such as:
• regular personal contact with clients, partners and others (who might have
useful views);
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• tracking media, websites and other publications that may have impact;
• establishing feedback points (such as websites) and processes to draw in
comments, and tracking input;
• regular reporting on project milestones; and
• reriodic questionnaires and/or surveys.
What will success here look like? Organisations with effective monitoring and
evaluation processes in place will be able to:
• be trusted and therefore effective in continuing their role;
• maintain delivery of services and products; and
• change these deliveries quickly through timely interventions.
Evaluating the risk communications process
Any properly managed process includes evaluation of its effectiveness and, con-
sidering the risks organisations face, this is particularly important for risk commu-
nications. In practical terms however, this is more easily said than done.
The key principle is that risk communications must be consistent with the overall
communications objectives of the organisation, which in turn have to be embed-
ded in the overall management process of the organisation. As stated previously
risk communications cannot be separated from other corporate functions.
The first requirement is to define outcomes in a manner that lends them to
measurement. Clearly what constitutes success must be known, yet in some as-
pects of risk communications this can be subjective and affected by other com-
munications emanating from the organisation or from other sources.
Once the outcomes and audiences have been determined and the communica-
tions strategies and activities defined, then evaluation is important for such rea-
sons as:
• ensuring the communications are achieving their goals;
• identifying problems that require solution;
• maintaining a watching brief on known risks and identifying new ones;
• monitoring stakeholders’ attitudes;
• understanding what strategies work and which do not work; and
• assessing cost-effectiveness.
It is important to engage others in the evaluation process. There are three key
groups here:
• stakeholders who are the audiences for the risk communications;
• staff who have undertaken the risk communications for the organisation; and
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• management and governance representatives for whom the risk management
was implemented.
In dealing with stakeholders it is important to ask such questions as:
• Did they understand the objectives?
• How successful were the communications?
• What participation was needed and offered?
In dealing with staff involved in the communications it is important to ask such
questions as:
• Were the right audiences identified?
• Were there sufficient resources available?
• Were the right delivery mechanisms chosen?
• Was their organisation sufficiently supportive and interested in the results?
• What other influences could be impacting on the communication success?
In dealing with management and governance it is important to ask such ques-
tions as:
• Are the results suitable for assessing the intent and for any related decision
making?
• How did the results impact on organisational decision making?
• Are staff and resources cost effective?
• Are there changes in corporate intent?
• What other external factors might need to be considered?
A range of methods are available, including questionnaires, interviews (structured
and unstructured), focus groups, observation and survey.
Embedding and Improving the Risk Communication Process
Improving senior level understanding of risk communication issues
One of the more complicated components of risk communication is when risk is
communicated through a third party. This can typically happen when politicians
or senior executives are the spokespeople on a risk, such as often occurs in a
crisis.  It is important that in times of crisis leaders take on the role of spokespeople
but it can be difficult for the leaders if risk management is not embedded in their
organisation.
Underpinning effective communication are openness and inclusiveness. Both within
an organisation and between an organisation and its stakeholders, pre-estab-
lished relationships and a level of trust are vital. Crises are characterised by a
rapidly evolving and problematic series of events. Because of this, information
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can rapidly become out of date and verification of information may not be as
rigorous as normal circumstances would permit. It is therefore important that in a
crisis situation spokespeople are aware of the accuracy and lifespan of informa-
tion they receive and that they are able to relay this to other stakeholders. Doing
this as a regular part of risk communication will provide good grounding for
situations that may upscale and require crisis communication.
For public-owned organisations, especially, there is an expectation that consulta-
tion around risk decision-making will occur with a wide range of stakeholders.
They also need to be aware of the interests of specific stakeholder groups. This is
in part because of the flow-on effects of crisis impacts and in part because of the
consultative process that would normally apply in any business project.
An example of when stakeholder expectations and spokesperson communication
were not synchronised was the Waiheke Island foot and mouth scare in 2005.
One of the few criticisms that was received regarding the way that the incident
was handled was that specific stakeholders – farmers and residents of the island
and surrounding areas – did not think that they had been appropriately informed
of the response that was occurring and what they needed to do. In this case the
spokespeople addressed all stakeholders with one message but the attempts of
farmers to find out further information were not adequately accommodated.
The Federated Farmers President’s Address to the Association of Former MPs in
Wellington on July 13 2005 highlighted this, as have several other stakeholders in
this incident:
There also seemed to be little recognition of the need to communi-
cate with livestock owners in the surrounding Auckland, Coromandel
and Northland areas. They needed advice on how to minimise spread
and the risk to themselves. Federated Farmers filled this gap by
communicating directly to members. In contrast, MAF’s (Ministry of
Agriculture and Fisheries) communications appear to rely on com-
municating through the media.
To ensure that participants in crisis risk communication are accommodated, sen-
ior level understanding and involvement is required as an ongoing component of
risk management. Within this role senior level spokespeople can help to establish
expectations of crisis response by discussing constraints that will likely occur.
This can be a component of regular interactions with stakeholders at a strategic
level or to a wider stakeholder group through newsletters or press releases.
An example is the ongoing role of Civil Defence Minister Rick Barker in maintain-
ing awareness of activities that have been undertaken to address communica-
tions needs for a civil defence emergency. This has included updating the public
on arrangements that have been made as well as explaining difficulties with
implementing various suggested strategies.
The Dominion Post reported in October 2006:
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Civil Defence Minister Rick Barker says people can’t rely on text
messaging to warn them of an impending tsunami as Vodafone and
Telecom’s networks would soon clog up.
Speaking at a conference in Auckland last month, Mr Barker said it
would take several hours to send civil defence warnings to all
cellphones using available technology.
“The use of cell broadcasting technology does allow text messages
to be sent simultaneously to all mobile phones in a predetermined
geographical area, without having to queue messages.” But New
Zealand telcos do not have the equipment to do this.
A Tsunami Working Group, established after a civil defence forum in
August, will look at “technical problems and costs associated with
developing cell broadcasting”, he says...
Establishing a risk communication role for senior level spokespeople can be
highly effective, especially in utilising the media to convey a message, but only if
they are familiar with the expectations of and desired outcomes of their commu-
nications.
Organisational learning
Another component of improving risk communication is learning from the past.
Both mistakes and successes provide learning opportunities for managing future
risks and improving current risk management. The role of executives in support-
ing and contributing towards this makes embedding risk management and risk
communication into an organisational culture more effective than when they are
not involved.
For example, it can be difficult for middle management to implement a strategy
without buy-in from all levels of the organisation. They should be willing to come
under scrutiny for how they can improve their role in risk communications. Every
person in an organisation has a role as a risk communicator, be it to their col-
leagues, business acquaintances, or to the public through friends and family.
Exploring the impacts that this can have on risk communication strategies by
drawing on past experiences, as well as examining specifically overt risk commu-
nications that were (and continue to be) implemented, is a valuable way to
identify components of risk communication that can be expanded upon and where
remedial work is required. This can then be turned into inputs for further evolving
the organisation’s risk communication. For example, it may be that some staff are
well known in the community and can act as a conduit. Others may have specific
interests that relate to risks the organisation is seeking to address.
Following on from successes with health and nutrition initiatives, the Pacific Fam-
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ily Violence Prevention Strategy (Ministry of Social Development) has undertaken
to engage with Pacific communities through community groups, church and womens’
groups and youth leaders to develop Pacific early prevention resources and strat-
egies.
The objective is to change attitudes that contribute to violent behaviour in Pacific
families. By recognising the key community focal points for influencing Pacific
communities through previous public engagement on other risks, the Ministry of
Social Development was able to target its risk communications.
Most organisations in New Zealand attempt to learn from previous experiences,
with communication being a common failing that is frequently identified. One of
the reasons that this comes up so regularly is that there can be an acceptance
that communications will always be a problem. By further investigating the as-
pects of communication that did not perform there may be opportunities to refine
future risk communication strategies to better meet the organisation and their
stakeholders needs. Conducting this self-examination should be an integral part
of a risk communication strategy.
Looking forward: identifying those issues on the horizon that require early
implementation of risk communication strategies
Regardless of the stakeholders and risks involved there is benefit to looking
forward and preparing for implementing future risk communications
One critical aspect of a risk communication strategy is to establish an ongoing or
ad-hoc risk communication group. This is ideally established proactively rather
than responsively. An ad-hoc group might only meet intermittently to reassess
risk communication for a given risk or class of risks that have yet to be realised.
This is done to maintain currency of the strategy and group participants.
An ongoing risk communication group may meet regularly for the duration of a
given risk management project or as part of the overall risk management pro-
gramme of an organisation – looking at the full breadth of risks that the organi-
sation is involved in managing.
The role of the risk communication group typically involves:
• Establishing a risk communications team – this might include a risk manager,
a communications manager, a technical specialist and a senior manager. For
whole of government teams the group may be quite expansive but for specific
organisations teams could be as small as 2-3 people.
• Determining the objectives – this may include developing communication rela-
tionships with stakeholders; raising stakeholder awareness of risks; obtaining
stakeholder input on risk strategies; establishing realistic expectations; iden-
tifying gaps in the current risk communication strategy; and specifying the
scope within which communications will be bounded. For example, identifying
what information can or cannot be discussed due to commercial sensitivity.
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Case Study – Project Roadbridge
Coal producer, Solid Energy uses risk management techniques, including risk
communication principles, as part of its day-to-day approach to managing its
projects and operations.  The need to transport coal by truck, over an almost
two-year period, to make up shortfall in rail capacity while the Midland Line
was upgraded demonstrates the benefits that can be achieved as a result of
implementing these techniques.
Solid Energy is a state-owned enterprise, and New Zealand’s largest coal
producer and distributor, with six underground and opencast mines in the
Waikato, Southland and the West Coast of the South Island. Total coal pro-
duction is around 4.5 million tonnes (mt) per annum, with about half ex-
ported and the remainder used within New Zealand for electricity generation
and industrial/commercial energy.
Export coal from its West Coast mines is transported by rail on the Midland
Line to the Port of Lyttelton, near Christchurch on the east coast, where it is
loaded onto ships.  Until the end of June 2006, the volume of coal that could
be carried along the Midland Line was limited by several factors, including
speed and weight restrictions along several portions of the railway track.
In July 2004 the Government set up the agency, ONTRACK, to own and main-
• Preparing a stakeholder map – identifying what concerns and interests differ-
ent stakeholders have regarding a given risk; identifying stakeholders that
have strategic, operational and consultative expectations; attempting to group
stakeholders in order to better target risk communications.
• Determining appropriate fora and engagement schedules for communicating
with stakeholder groups – identifying which stakeholder groups require ongo-
ing interaction in shaping the risk management and which require intermittent
information dissemination.
• Establishing relationships with stakeholders – finding and communicating
through key contacts can optimise the value of risk communications by ensur-
ing that the right people have the right communication and opportunity to
respond.
• Monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of stakeholder engagement – con-
tinuous monitoring to ensure that stakeholder relationships and interactions
are ongoing maintains the currency of the risk communication.
• Maintaining the strategic communication objectives – checking that risk com-
munications are continuing to contribute towards the objectives of the risk
communication strategy and that the risk communication strategy and capac-
ity evolves as necessary.
• The specifics of what and how will vary with different risk communications,
but determining an approach that can be consistently applied and built upon
such as this is often useful.
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tain New Zealand’s rail infrastructure.  ONTRACK has been upgrading the line
by improving ventilation in the Otira Tunnel, strengthening bridges and con-
structing crossing loops to allow the running of longer trains.   In 2004 Solid
Energy identified an opportunity to increase annual rail capacity from 2.1 mt
to 2.4 mt by using an extra train running between Reefton and Lyttelton.  But
to do this coal would have to be transported by truck and trailer units from
the Ngakawau coal handling facility, north of Westport, to the rail load-out at
Reefton.  Although not ideal, trucking coal was considered necessary to meet
contracted international coal sales.
Up to 1,200 tonnes of coal per day, 7 days per week, had to be trucked from
Ngakawau to Reefton to meet the new rail schedule.  This equated to about
40 return truck movements, over a 24 hour day, via State Highways 67, 6 and
69.  Transit’s designated heavy trucking route includes the town of Westport,
several small communities and the Buller Gorge with several sections of
narrow and winding highway that is also a significant tourist route.
The temporary trucking operation was tagged Project Roadbridge by the
company.  By the time annual rail capacity was increased to 2.7 mt at the end
of June 2006, Roadbridge had run almost continuously for 22 months – from
August 2004 to June 2006. Until Roadbridge, Solid Energy had trucked coal
only relatively short distances or for short periods of time. This trucking
initiative represented a noticeable increase in heavy vehicle movements through
several West Coast communities. Hence, it was likely to attract high public
and stakeholder visibility.
Solid Energy brought together a multi-disciplinary team, led by the Logistics
Manager, to plan and manage the implementation of Roadbridge.  The team
included operations, distribution, communications, environmental and risk staff.
From the outset it was determined that the activities had to be undertaken to
the highest standards to minimise risk to reputation and to the operation
itself.  Prior to the start of Roadbridge and for the first few months of the
Truck and trailer units owned by the transport contractor, TNL Ltd.
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operation, the team met weekly, and thereafter regularly, to review progress
and to identify and address risks.  Only when the team felt that all elements
were in place, was the decision made to start the trucking operation.
A key early initiative was a risk workshop, which brought together the Solid
Energy team with external project members including the trucking contractor,
TNL Ltd. (TNL).  Among the many benefits of this exercise was the develop-
ment of a comprehensive project implementation manual incorporating the
risk controls and mitigations identified during (and subsequent to) the work-
shop.
The shared objectives developed by the group formed the foundation of the
working relationship and commitment needed to deliver ‘best practice’ bulk
goods transport over a sustained period of operation within a sensitive pub-
lic environment. This was confirmed by the project partners receiving a spe-
cific commendation from the Land Transport Safety Authority, following its
audit of the operation.
Given that the trucking operation would be a relatively high-profile activity
on the West Coast, effective stakeholder communication and consultation
was identified as a critical element of project planning and implementation.
The initial risk workshop provided an excellent opportunity for the project
team members to gain a shared understanding of the risks associated with
the project, both from a company perspective and that of the trucking con-
tractor.  This was a valuable internal communication tool and underpinned
the excellent relationship between all parties during the project implementa-
tion phase.
During the project planning stage the stakeholder communication and con-
sultation plan was developed.  Key elements included:
• identification of key messages that the company needed to communicate
to internal and external stakeholders;
• the incorporation of past experience over several years with external con-
sultation and communication within the local communities on mining is-
sues;
• designation of various roles and responsibilities for stakeholder commu-
nications, including the media;
• identification of communication methods including community newslet-
ters, letterbox drops for people along the trucking route, targeted face to
face consultation with various parties including local government agen-
cies and businesses, press releases, advertising and implementation of
internal project information sharing and procedures for response to inci-
dents; and
• development of public feedback mechanisms such as contact telephone
numbers on each truck and trailer unit, names and contact numbers of
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company representatives for each area covered by the trucking route and
listed in community newsletters, plus protocols for responding to public
feedback.
These activities enabled Solid Energy to identify specific concerns about the
operation within the community and wherever possible incorporate mitiga-
tions into the project planning and implementation.  This also facilitated a
high level of engagement between key stakeholders and the project team,
both prior to the operation commencing and as the trucking proceeded.  Of
note was that more stakeholder feedback was received before the trucking
started than during the operation itself.
Driver performance was regarded as an area of significant risk as the project
involved continual interaction with the travelling public.  Although the truck-
ing was carried out by a separate company, any issues or complaints about
driver behaviour were likely to impact adversely on Solid Energy.
The trucking contractor, TNL, fully understood this and, in conjunction with
Solid Energy, developed a detailed ‘rule book’ for the drivers.  This was used
as the basis for a project specific operator induction and training programme
fully supported by an internal audit system.  The outcome of this included
zero traffic infringements recorded during the project and several cases of
positive feedback from the public.
The table opposite provides a summary of several key issues identified in
developing and implementing the project, the resulting initiatives that were
implemented, and the outcomes.
Part of the communication strategy was a visit to local schools
by representatives from Solid Energy and TNL Ltd. to demonstrate
to the local children the truck and trailer units to be used during
the operation and highlight road safety.
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Solid Energy continues to develop risk communication strategies as a core
component of engaging with stakeholders, for both new and existing projects.
Risk communication is an interactive process producing benefits for all those
involved. By undertaking to understand and address stakeholder concerns as
a component of risk management the company has been able to contribute
towards public safety, increase goodwill towards Solid Energy and improve
quality assurance internally and with its partners – tangibles that would not
have been achieved as successfully without the principles and disciplines
offered by embracing risk communication techniques.
Issue Initiative Outcome 
Identification of issues 
and development of 
controls or mitigations. 
Risk workshop with 
representatives from all 
project parties. 
Communication of project issues. 
Shared understanding of project 
objectives. 
Buy-in from all parties. 
Commitment to implementing controls 
and mitigations that benefited all 
parties. 
Identification of stakeholders and the 
need for a comprehensive and 
considered consultation and 
communication strategy. 
Potential adverse 
public feeling 
impacting company 
reputation. 
Stakeholder consultation 
and communication 
strategy. 
Open communication channels to 
facilitate public feedback. 
Proactive dissemination of information, 
which could be managed by the 
company. 
Identification of opportunities to 
enhance reputation. 
Liaison established with roading 
authorities and maintenance 
contractors to ensure road repairs 
identified and repaired quickly. 
Direct results of 
contractor actions 
could adversely 
impact on principal’s 
reputation. 
Compilation of 
comprehensive 
implementation manual for 
the project incorporating 
contractor operating 
procedures based around 
outcomes of risk workshop, 
together with driver 
induction and training 
programme with periodic on 
the job audits. 
Positively influencing truck driver 
behaviour. 
Generated positive feedback from 
public. 
Gained special commendation from 
Land Transport Safety Authority. 
Over 18,000 loads and 4,500,000 km 
without a single traffic infringement. 
Concerns raised about 
increasing heavy 
traffic movements 
outside local schools. 
School visits by 
representatives of company 
and trucking contractor. 
Raised awareness of potential hazards 
within school community. 
Voluntary imposition of reduced speed 
limits and flexible load scheduling. 
Reputation of company enhanced by 
demonstrating proactive approach to 
road safety. 
18,000 truck movements with no 
incidents. 
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The third in CAENZ’s Future series of risk management texts, Challenging the
Future invites readers to extend their thinking on the communication of risk
through practical application. This book is the culmination of three years
investigation into risk communication practice in New Zealand and consists
of both commentary and examples of risk communication in practice.
Building on previous work CAENZ has undertaken in this area, professionals
in the risk and communication fields have come together to discuss and draw
on their own and others experience and understanding of applying risk
communication in New Zealand. The authors use case studies to illustrate
the implementation of risk communication within organisations and with
external parties ranging from contractors to the public.
Risk communication is a relatively young discipline, but is becoming increasingly
important in environments where consultation and shared responsibility
feature. Risk communication is an integral component of risk management
and a focus of many communicators as it can be used to meet legislative
and good practice requirements across a range of applications. It is hoped
that through this publication readers will be able to apply some of the lessons
shared by others to the implementation of risk communication in their own
field of practice.
Written to appeal to a range of risk and communications professionals, this
book visits risk communication from the perspective of risk managers, analysts,
communicators and academics. The intent is to provide a practical resource
for developing risk communication strategies by drawing on the disciplines
of risk management and communications management. Recognising that risk
communication needs vary greatly it is hoped that the examples in Challenging
the Future will assist readers to challenge their own thinking and find
innovative solutions to their risk communications needs.
